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1. THE TAX SYSTEM OF HABSBURG AND BOURBON SPAIN 
The analysis of  the continuities and changes in the Spanish taxation system is 
a very interesting research field. Since any modern public tax system reflects not only 
the evolution of  a given state machine, but also of  an entire community, studying the 
characteristics and innovations of  tributary mechanisms ultimately involves the 
elucidation of  continuous aspects and changes in the society itself.  
Iberian taxation of  the early modern period was characterized by the 
presence of  at least three features which made it similar to the taxation systems of  
most of  the coeval European States: 1) the existence of  different tax regimes, due to 
the political, institutional and administrative separation between the two Crowns of  
Castile and Aragon which constituted the monarchy; 2) the legitimacy of  
differentiated taxation systems based on rank and territory, which led to two different 
types of  socio-economic inequality: firstly between the Crowns of  Castile and 
Aragon; secondly, between classes of  taxpayers (pecheros) with a detrimental effect on 
those belonging to the estado llano (i.e. the unprivileged classes); and 3) an extremely 
wide variety of  taxes – mainly indirect – the stratification of  which (since the end of  
the sixteenth century) gave rise to a very complex situation both from the juridical 
and administrative point of  view. It should also be noted that, as in all tax systems of  
the time, collecting methods deeply affected the nature of  each tax. Therefore, recent 
historiography has frequently underlined the fact that, in the Old Regime, tributary 
mechanisms such as those in the Castilian taxation system, cannot be studied 
exclusively by taking account of  the legal definitions of  taxes.1 
The purpose of  this work is twofold: on the one hand, it attempts to illustrate 
the continuities that can be found within the Spanish taxation system, in particular, 
the Castilian system during the eighteenth century. Despite the War of  the Spanish 
Succession and the Nueva Planta taxation system of  the Aragonian Crown, the 
Bourbons did not abolish the taxation system inherited from the Habsburgs, but 
tried as far as possible to improve it. Up until the implementation of  the Castilian 
cadastre promoted by Zenón de Somodevilla, Marquis of  the Ensenada, the 
                                                          
* This text is part of  the research project Política económica, circulación internacional de las ideas económicas y 
esfera pública en España, 1680–1840, codex HAR2011-29036-C02-01, supported by the Ministerio de 
Economía y Competitividad, Spain. A preliminary italian version was presented at the conference La 
fiscalità nell’Europa cattolica. Riflessioni e linguaggi fra dimensione religiosa e pratiche politiche (secoli XIV–XIX), 
held at Teramo University’s Department of  Political Studies (18–19 November 2009), whose 
proceedings, edited by M. C. Giannini, will appear soon. 
 
1 On the specific case of  the Castilian servicios de millones, see J. I. ANDRÉS UCENDO, La fiscalidad en 
Castilla en el Siglo XVII: los servicios de millones, 1601–1700, Bilbao 1999, pp. 15–23. On the regulatory 
framework and the administrative practices, see the treatise by Juan de la Ripia, Práctica de la 
adminsitración y cobranza de las Rentas Reales [...], firstly published in 1676, which was reissued at least five 
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Bourbon governments attempted administrative reforms aimed at rationalizing the 
system in force, based on consumption taxes and customs duties.  
The continuity between the Habsburgs’ age and the rule of  the first two 
Spanish Bourbons was mainly a result of  the capacity of  both sets of  administrations 
to plan economic policies and was enhanced by the use by officials in the eighteenth 
century of  a wide range of  seventeenth-century texts on economy and taxation to 
develop their technical skills. Some of  these texts were reprinted throughout the 
eighteenth century. 2 In many of  these arbitrios, several hypotheses for a radical 
reform of  the Spanish tax system had already been suggested – from single taxes to 
cadastral plans.3 The most surprising case was the plan of  fiscal reorganization 
proposed by José Gonzalez in 1650, which was elaborated by Martín de Loynaz a 
century later and re-proposed as late as 1821 by one of  the staunchest Spanish liberal 
thinkers, Valentín de Foronda.4 
The awareness of  the injustices inherent in the Spanish tax system led the 
proyectistas and the reformist groups that were active during the reigns of  Philip V and 
Ferdinand VI to formulate two alternative proposals which nevertheless had the 
same objective, namely «el alivio del estado llano». On the one hand, they aimed at 
reducing the indirect fiscal pressure on productive classes; this worked to the 
detriment of  foreign merchants by shifting the burden of  taxation from 
consumption taxes to customs duties and was the result of  a protectionist policy. On 
the other hand, they attempted to pursue a gradual shift from indirect to direct taxes 
imposed on realties, through the implementation of  a cadastre based on land 
measurement and surveys. Even though the reformist ministers of  Charles III and 
his son followed more or less coherently the two paths outlined in the early 
eighteenth century, both options were frustrated. 
On the other hand, an examination of  the eighteenth century reforms 
applied to economy and taxation allows the wider question of  the roots of  the 
Iberian Ilustración to be tackled from an original perspective. It stands to reason that 
the Ilustración was the result of  the confluence of  a plurality of  traditions, currents of  
thought and branches of  knowledge, old and new. Prominent among these were the 
proyectismo heir to the seventeenth-century arbitrismo; the persistent regalist tradition 
revitalized by the reforming trends within Catholicism (in addition to Jansenism, 
Febronianism and Antonio Pereira’s theories); natural law; and, lastly, political (or 
“civil”) economy, the scientific and academic status of  which was defined precisely 
during the reign of  Charles III thanks to the Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País 
and the creation of  the first university chairs. This (and other) theoretical systems 
were combined and hybridized by the ilustrados according to their political struggle 
and related reformatory planning – which was sometimes confused, but at other 
times was more coherent and effective. The aim was to correct some of  the most 
                                                          
2 Mention should be made of  the Riqueza firme y estable de España […] published by Sancho de 
Moncada in Madrid in the crucial year 1619. The treatise was reprinted, again in Madrid, during 1746 
with the title Restauración política de España […]. Moncada’s text constantly served as a referral source 
for the most important Iberian proyectistas and reformers of  the eighteenth century, from Uztáriz to 
Campomanes and Jovellanos. 
3 J. L. SUREDA CARRIÓN, Las doctrinas fiscales de Jacinto de Alcázar y Francisco Centani, «Anales de 
economía», 24 (1946), pp. 379–401; ID., La Hacienda castellana y los economistas del siglo XVII, Madrid 
1949, pp. 215–227. An original cadastral project was proposed in 1671 by the Italian Francesco 
Centani in his Tierras: medios universales […]. 
4 See infra. 
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evident injustices in the coeval class-based society. It is interesting to note here that 
the reformers and ilustrados, especially at the end of  the eighteenth century, clearly 
sought to formulate a new concept of  tax equity suited to absolute monarchy, which, 
by assuming public happiness as a universal meter of  distributive justice, began to 
explicitly criticize the economic inequality born of  the privilege-based society of  the 
old regime.  
Since, due to the vastness of  the subject, it is necessary to select a point of  
view whereby the existence of  the connection between “ideas” (and thus, cultural 
history) and tax reforms may be verified, I will adopt as a preferential perspective the 
vision of  the role of  the Church and the clergy that Spanish proyectistas, reformers 
and ilustrados developed during the seventeenth century. Undoubtedly, the attack 
against clerical immunities and properties, which was explicit in the two paradigmatic 
cases of  the expropriation of  the Jesuit temporalidades after the expulsion of  the 
Spanish branch of  the Society of  Jesus (1767), and of  the desamortización in 1798, 
represented one of  the most important watersheds in the history of  Early Modern 
Spain. It is worthwhile insisting on the validity of  this argument in order to challenge 
the deep-seated historiographical cliché (which has often been promoted to the rank 
of  self-evident thesis) according to which late eighteenth century reformism would 
be weaker and far more unrealistic than the pragmatic and “administrative” 
reformism of  the reigns of  Philip V and Ferdinand VI. 5 
Before going any further, I consider it worthwhile to provide some elements 
which will allow the contextualization of  the continuities and ruptures in Iberian 
taxation practice and theory during the eighteenth century. In particular, I will focus 
my attention mainly on the fiscal mechanisms of  the Crown of  Castile, since it was 
the core of  the Spanish monarchy for a long time. It is not by chance that most of  
the reform projects, during the eighteenth century, concerned its taxation system. 
Tax levying in the Iberian kingdoms was essentially based on nine types of  
taxes:6 1) property taxes and revenues from the Crown assets; 2) taxes paid by the 
                                                          
5 Such a thesis has recently been revived, for instance, by J. GUILLAMÓN ÁLVAREZ, La Guerra de 
Sucesión y el comienzo de la reformas borbónicas, in El cambio dinástico y sus repercusiones en la España del Siglo 
XVIII. Homenaje al Dr. Luis Coronas Tejada, edited by J. FERNÁNDEZ GARCÍA, M. A. BEL BRAVO, J. M. 
DELGADO BARRADO, Jaén 2000, pp. 529–542. However, for an overall assessment of  the economic 
reforms carried out or passed during the reign of  Charles III, see V. LLOMBART, La política económica de 
Carlos III. ¿Fiscalismo, cosmética o estímulo al crecimiento?, «Revista de Historia Económica», XII, 1 (1994), 
pp. 11–39. With regard to the history of  ideas, see, by the same author, El pensamiento económico de la 
Ilustración en España (1730–1812), in Economía y economistas españoles, edited by E. FUENTES QUINTANA, 
vol. 3 (La Ilustración), Barcelona 2000, pp. 7–89. 
6 I follow the generally useful classification proposed by D. DESDEVIDES DU DEZERT, La España del 
Antiguo Régimen, Madrid 1989, pp. 424–446. See also the excellent summary by M. ARTOLA, La 
Hacienda del Antiguo Régimen, Madrid 1982. For a chronological overview of  the Spanish monarchy 
taxation system (and its political mechanisms) from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, see S. 
MOXÓ Y ORTIZ DE VILLAJOS, La alcabala. Sus orígines, concepto y naturaleza, Madrid 1963; J. GARCÍA 
LOMBARDERO Y VIÑAS, Algunos problemas de la administración y cobranzas de las Rentas Provinciales en la 
primera mitad del siglo XVIII, in Dinero y crédito (siglos XVI y XVII). Actas del primer coloquio internacional de 
Historia económica, edited by A. OTAZU, Madrid 1978, pp. 63–78; J. HERNÁNDEZ ANDREU, Evolución 
histórica de la contribución directa en España desde 1700 a 1814, in Historia económica de España, edited by ID., 
Madrid 1978, pp. 121–183; M. ULLOA, La Hacienda real de Castilla en el Reinado de Felipe II, Madrid 1986; 
Haciendas forales y Hacienda real: homenaje a D. Miguel Artola y D. Felipe Ruiz Martín, edited by E. 
FERNÁNDEZ DE PINEDO, Bilbao 1987; J. I. FORTEA PÉREZ, Monarquía y Cortes en Castilla. Las ciudades 
ante la política fiscal de Felipe II, Valladolid 1990; J. A. SÁNCHEZ BELÉN, La política fiscal en Castilla durante el 
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clergy; 3) dues from the nobles; 4) consumption taxes (called Rentas Provinciales in 
eighteenth century Castile); 5) customs duties or Rentas Generales; 6) monopolies and 
sovereign rights; 7) tributes from the tax-exempt and autonomous provinces (the 
Kingdom of  Navarre, the three Basque Provinces and the states belonging to the 
Crown of  Aragon); 8) the Rentas de Indias; 7 9) other miscellaneous taxes.8 
The financial structure of  the monarchy was based on indirect taxes, in 
particular those levied on consumption in the Kingdom of  Castile. The most 
important source of  income was the alcabala sales tax, created by Alfonso XI in 1342. 
This permanent tax, whose nominal rate was ten percent, was a consumption tax 
imposed on any transaction of  movable and immovable property. 9 Between 1639 
and 1663, the Cortes voted to increase the tax rate by an additional four percent (the 
cientos). After the early fifteenth century, the tax was levied on sellers, although they 
passed this on to the consumer in the sale price. It was a general levy, theoretically 
applied not only to pecheros10, but also to privileged groups; the clergy were exempt 
from it only in the event that the sale of  goods and products was not carried out for 
commercial purposes. The alcabala could be collected directly by the Crown or, more 
often, by a tax-farmer or contractor. Among major merchants, the habit was soon 
established of  paying a set amount agreed in advance between the tax-farmer and the 
                                                                                                                                                               
política económica en la época moderna, edited by L. A. RIBOT GARCÍA, L. DE ROSA, MADRID 2000, pp. 77–
99; J. E. GELABERT, La Bolsa del Rey. Rey, reino y fisco en Castilla (1598–1648), Barcelona 1997; ID., Castilla 
convulsa (1631–1652), Madrid 2001; R. CARANDE, Carlos V y sus banqueros, Barcelona 2000²; C. SANZ 
AYÁN, Estado, monarquía y finanzas. Estudios de Historia financiera en tiempos de los Austrias, Madrid 2004; 
Fiscalidad de Estado y fiscalidad municipal en los reinos hispa ́nicos medievales, edited by D. MENJOT, M. 
SÁNCHEZ, M. SÁNCHEZ MARTI ́NEZ, Madrid 2006; M. Á. LADERO QUESADA, La Hacienda Real de 
Castilla, 1369–1504, Madrid 2009. 
7 In the Spanish Americas there existed five main groups of  taxes: alcabalas, customs duties, 
consumption taxes, taxes on mines and the personal service tax owed by the indios. It has been 
calculated that between 1721 and 1740 the American tax system contributed to the Real Hacienda an 
amount fluctuating between 13 and 33% of  the total revenues: see B. H. SLICHER VAN BATH, Real 
Hacienda y economía en Hispanoamérica, 1541–1820, Amsterdam 1989. The first serious condemnation of  
the injustice of  the system and of  the exploitation of  the indios appeared in the Nuevo sistema de gobierno 
económico para América, a text written by the minister of  Philip V, José Campillo y Cosío and published 
only in 1789. On this subject, see R. EZQUERRA, La crítica española de la situación de América en el siglo 
XVIII, «Revista de Indias», 22, 87–88 (1962), pp. 161–286; S. J. STEIN-B. H. STEIN, Apogee of  Empire. 
Spain and New Spain in the Age of  Charles III, 1759–1789, Baltimore-London 2003; G. B. PAQUETTE, 
Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759–1808, New York 2008; Enlightened 
Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750–1830, edited by G. B. PAQUETTE, Farnham-
Burlington 2009. 
8 Among these kinds of  taxes, which were not included under a general definition and were 
administered individually, were the duties provided by the postal system, the permits necessary for the 
foundation of  a new majorat (an entailed estate inherited through primogeniture) or a 
fideicommissum (gracias al sacar petitions for legitimation), the costs for the provisioning and housing 
of  troops (utensilios, paja, alojamiento) and the royal lottery established by Charles III on the previous 
Neapolitan model. 
9 LADERO QUESADA, La Hacienda Real de Castilla, pp. 57–90. The alcabala was a “multiphasic” levy, 
since it was applied from the time of  production to the phase of  distribution and consumption of  
goods.  
10 Pechero was an individual tax-payer whose social condition was determined only by the obligation to 
pay the servicios voted by the Cortes. 
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seller (pago por iguala), which enabled avoidance of  the numerous control procedures 
related to the value and quantity of  goods11.  
At the beginning of  the sixteenth century, Castilian taxation underwent a 
radical transformation due to the introduction of  a third collection system, the so-
called encabezamiento. This was an arrangement whereby each local community agreed 
to pay to the Hacienda a lump-sum in place of  the revenues of  the alcabalas and the 
consumption taxes in general12. The Crown itself  moved towards this solution, 
because, considering the lack of  an efficient administration able to collect taxes 
economically, it preferred to raise a fixed and reliable sum of  money. This was 
achieved by apportioning set tax quotas among the main cities of  a province and, 
later, among the taxpayers of  each village. Those in charge of  the final calculation 
were local authorities (alcaldes, corregidores, magistrates), that, at least in theory, were 
supposed to ensure a certain equity by assigning to each head of  household a fee 
proportional to the wealth of  the family. Taxpayers could – again in theory – report 
any abuse or favouritism13. In the case of  the large Castilian manufacturing and 
trading centers, there were guilds – in Madrid, these were the Cinco gremios mayors – 
that fixed the single quotas payable by their members. However, the assignment of  a 
particular amount to a person was, obviously, often arbitrary. 
This system was formalized in 1536 when Charles V and the Cortes signed the 
first general encabezamiento in the history of  the Crown of  Castile: in this case, the 
Hacienda real (or to be more precise, the contadores or comptrollers) assigned a specific 
lump-sum payment to the eighteen cities which had a right to represent the kingdom. 
These cities then re-distributed the burden on their territory according to the system 
already in use for the collection of  ordinary and extraordinary subsidies (servicios) 
which had been voted in by the Cortes.14 Therefore, the encabezamiento contributed to 
the assimilation of  the alcabala into the servicios ordinarios, transforming it from an 
indirect tax on consumption and transactions into a fixed apportioned tax that was 
collected as an income tax, or, more frequently, simply as a personal tax.15 The 
                                                          
11 In the case of  food products (mainly cereals, meat, fish, wine and oil), tax-farmers were compelled 
not only to record in specific registers the arrival of  the goods at the city’s gates, but also to provide 
traders with weights and measures to calculate the quantity of  the product to be subtracted 
proportionate to the amount of  tax. 
12 The method of  the encabezamiento had been introduced for the first time in 1495 by the Catholic 
Monarchs and initially applied only to Castilian communities. 
13 The encabezamiento at a local level was an apportioned tax (impuesto de cupo), but it could become a 
differential tax (impuesto de cuota) based on the repartimiento, that is to say on an estimation (often 
approximate and intuitive) of  the tax base. The latter case frequently occurred when a single 
community did not produce the amount assigned to it by the city cabeza de partido represented in the 
Cortes. There were two types of  repartimientos: the por mayor, usually formulated by the Council of  
Castile, which allocated the quota for each Castilian province on the basis of  vencindarios (general 
censuses, such as the one conducted in 1594) that were infrequently updated and, therefore, not very 
reliable. Afterwards, the contadores mayores carried out the repartimiento por menor among the communities 
of  the single provincial districts. So, unlike the encabezamientos, the repartimientos did not provide for any 
negotiation between the central administration and the cities, whose municipal councils could only 
determine in detail the personal properties or goods to be taxed (sometimes through the system of  
sisas) in order to raise the assigned amounts. 
14 The second encabezamiento general was signed on October, 25, 1560, while the third one was signed on 
February, 22, 1575; its quota (two and a half  million ducats) was decreased by 27% during the Cortes 
of  Madrid in 1576. 
15 ARTOLA, La Hacienda, pp. 37–47, 50, 62–67; M. ASENJO GONZÁLEZ, Los encabezamientos de alcabalas 
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municipalities were usually opposed to this practice, because such direct taxes 
competed with municipal taxes (propios and arbitrios: dues at the town gates, rights on 
mills, fairs and butcher shops), that were generally based on indirect taxes and were 
farmed out.  
At the end of  the sixteenth century, the servicio de millones, which was voted for 
by the Cortes for the first time in 1590, became the second branch of  the Castilian 
taxation system. Between 1632 and 1637, salt, cattle, sugar, fish, chocolate and 
tobacco were added to the taxed staples (wine, oil, meat and vinegar). Taxes on 
luxury goods, as well as on bread, were always avoided, despite the periodic proposals 
to impose them. The initial amount – eight million ducats to be collected over six 
years – was later increased to twenty-four, and the collecting periods were deferred 
from time to time. As a consequence, in the first half  of  the seventeenth century, the 
servicios frequently overlapped one another, so that the Monarchy was forced to cancel 
the previous servicios, whose collection was not yet over (in 1636, for instance, three 
servicios were in force at the same time). After this time, the Crown contented itself  
with a fixed sum, that stabilized at around four million ducats. Initially, the millones 
were regarded in the same way as other voluntary contributions or servicios ordinarios 
and extraordinarios that the Cortes had started to pay since the beginning of  Charles V’s 
reign. Later the millones were automatically renewed, without the need to convene the 
Cortes: in 1601, a permanent commission of  millones was created and in 1658, this 
became a sala de millones annexed to the Consejo de Hacienda (Council of  the Treasury), 
with the specific task of  representing the kingdom (namely, the eighteen cities with 
the right to vote)16. Therefore, in the second half  of  the seventeenth century, the 
millones became a permanent branch of  the royal taxation, and revenues from this 
source were greater than any other income since 1601. In addition, the system used 
in this case was the apportionment of  quotas according to the three levels of  the 
encabezamiento: provincial, municipal and local. However, unlike what had happened in 
the case of  the alcabalas encabezadas, they were collected by means of  the old system 
of  sisas (in force since the fourteenth century), which involved a deduction from a 
maximum of  1/8 to a minimum of  1/24 of  the quantity of  the product sold. In 
essence, the buyer of  a given merchandise received a lesser quantity at the same 
price, and that difference was the amount of  the levy. In theory, the seller remitted to 
the Hacienda a sum equivalent to the deducted amount, but in practice, neither the 
Royal Treasury was able to monitor each individual collection, nor the municipal 
authorities – which did not receive any commission on the taxes – were incentivized 
to make the appropriate controls in taverns and markets.  
The creation (in 1642) of  the fiel medidor – a venal office entrusted with 
inspections – limited the problem of  tax evasion, but it did not prevent the clergy 
from enjoying a special immunity called refacción, which was soon extended 
improperly. As Pope Innocent XII confirmed in his brief  of  1722, the clergy had to 
pay the millones only on goods of  personal consumption bought at the market, but 
not on products grown on ecclesiastical lands nor on products destined for divine 
worship or alms. However, since it was practically impossible to distinguish the 
former from the latter case, it was decided that at the end of  each year, the secular 
                                                          
16 The eighteen cities accounted for as many Castilian provinces. During the seventeenth century, four 
more cities were added and their number reached twenty-two: Galicia (1623), Extremadura (1652), 
Palencia (1666), la Mancha (1700). 
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authorities should compensate the clergy, and specific funds derived from the 
encabezamientos were set aside to this end. The main obstacle was that many officials, 
fearing to be excommunicated, preferred not to charge the millones to the clerics. As 
Miguel de Zavala y Auñón (a former collaborator of  the intendant of  Catalonia José 
Patiño,) would complain in a Representación of  1732 addressed to Philip V, tax evasion 
was very common, and the burden of  paying the refacción ended up being born 
entirely by the fuegos (households) encabezados.17 
After the millones, the alcabalas and the various donations voted for by the 
Cortes, the taxes that produced the highest revenues for the Royal Treasury during the 
Old Regime18 were the sovereign rights (regalías), namely royal prerogatives such as 
customs and monopolies.19 Unlike all the servicios voted for by the Cortes, the revenues 
gained through regalías were administered by the king as the repository of  
sovereignty. Customs duties or Rentas Generales were divided into terrestrial, fluvial 
and maritime taxes. Before the reform introduced by Philip V in 1708, domestic 
customs passes (or puertos secos) separated off  the territories of  the monarchy one 
from another, and in particular the Crown of  Castile from the Crown of  Aragon.20  
Under the Habsburgs, the Church of  the Iberian kingdoms also gave a large 
contribution to finance the costs of  the monarchy: the amount of  the levy was high, 
even though undoubtedly not proportional to the real estate wealth accumulated by 
the church in the peninsula and in the colonies. In fact, from the end of  the fifteenth 
century until the eighteenth century concordats, the Holy See gave substantial shares 
of  its ecclesiastical incomes to the Spanish monarchs, in return for their support of  
Catholicity. This practice began during the Reconquista, when the Popes conceded the 
so-called tercias reales (namely two-ninths of  all the tithes paid to the Church). This 
continued in 1485 with the promulgation of  the Crusade Bull, and in 1523, when 
                                                          
17 M. ZAVALA Y AUÑÓN, Representación al Rey N. Señor D. Phelipe V dirigida al más seguro aumento del Real 
Erario y conseguir la felicidad, mayor alivio, riqueza y abundancia de su Monarquía, n. p., Madrid 1732. It was 
later reprinted in Miscelánea económico-política o discursos políticos varios, Pamplona, Herederos de Martínez, 
1749, pp. 7–180. In his Representación, Zavala, who had contributed to the launch of  the Catalan 
cadastre, defended his and Patiño’s action. Twenty-one years later Zavala’s treatise was discussed by F. 
Véron de Forbonnais in his Considérations sur les finances d’Espagne: see N. GUASTI, Il ‘ragno di Francia’ e la 
‘mosca di Spagna’: Forbonnais e la riforma della fiscalità all’epoca di Ensenada e Machault, «Cromohs», 9 (2004), 
pp. 1–38 (http://www.cromohs.unifi.it/9_2004/guasti_forbonnais.html). 
18 The oldest and most important monopolies were those on salt, lead, sulphur and snow, to which, 
during the third decade of  the seventeenth century, there were added duties on spirits (1632–1717), 
stamped paper (1632), tobacco (1636), gunpowder and playing cards (1636). From the beginning of  
the seventeenth century on, royal monopolies were called siete rentillas (or seven minor revenues). The 
collection of  revenues coming from the goods under state monopoly was usually farmed out, 
although in the case of  salt there was established a collection system of  compulsory assignment to 
each community of  quotas whose value was established by the Crown (acopios). Also in this case, the 
apportionment was carried out by local authorities. 
19 One of  the chronic problems of  the Spanish tax system was due to the asientos or short-term debt 
contracts. The inability of  the Crown to repay the loans and their interest forced the monarchs to 
issue the juros (interest-bearing state bonds) and, thus to consolidate public debt. The most desired 
bonds were those situados or secured against specific levies: in other words, the holder of  the juro 
obtained the perpetual (in case of  a lifetime juro) or temporary right to keep the proceeds from the 
collection of  a specific tax. 
20 With the passing of  time, the rates of  customs duties varied, with no distinction between imports 
and exports: they usually oscillated from 15 to 30% ad valorem. The most important entries during the 
Habsburg period were the Sevillian almojarifazgo, the renta de lana (on the exportation of  raw wool) and 
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Adrian VI entrusted the Crown with the management of  the estates (revenues 
included) of  the three main religious-chivalric orders (Santiago, Calatrava and 
Alcántara). In 1561, Rome authorized the Spanish clergy to pay to the Hacienda the 
subsidio (i.e. one-tenth of  the ecclesiastical revenues), resorting, also in this case, to 
the system of  agreed quotas. Finally, in July 1567, Pius V granted perpetually to the 
Crown the produce of  the total tithe paid by the third largest producer of  each 
village or, from 1570 on, by the first tither or casa diezmera of  each parish. Due to the 
impossibility for the royal administration of  collecting autonomously the tribute in 
kind, five-year concordias or agreements were negotiated with the primate of  Spain, the 
Archbishop of  Toledo, who monetized the established amount (250,000 ducats in 
1572) in order to pay it to the Hacienda over a period of  five years. 21 
Considering taxation from a theoretical point of  view, it should be noted that, 
from the end of  the sixteenth century onwards, it became one of  the topics of  the 
complex debate on the causes of  the monarchy’s decadence. Generations of  Iberian 
officials, clerics and intellectuals, especially during the seventeenth century, tried to 
define the origin and the characteristics of  the crisis in Spanish politics, society and 
the economy. The result was a real economic “literary genre”, the arbitrismo, which 
proposed a whole host of  reforms and solutions to ward off  the incipient crisis of  
the monarchy. The malfunctioning of  the tax system, in particular the Castilian one, 
was among the central elements of  what John H. Elliott described as «self-perception 
of  decadence».22 The climax of  this debate was reached during the second decade of  
the seventeenth century, with the famous consulta of  the Consejo de Castilla dated 1619 
and the subsequent discussion on the economic conditions of  the country. Most of  
the numerous treatises that circulated at the time – such as, for instance, the 
Conservación de Monarquías by Pedro Fernández de Navarrete (1621) – took into 
consideration the role played by the fiscal imbalance in the commercial and 
productive stagnation. Among the remedies more frequently suggested by the 
arbitristas was the need to reduce the tax burden on the productive classes and, 
proportionally, to make more equitable the contribution of  the clergy to the 
maintenance of  the monarchy. Arbitristas (along with many seventeenth-century 
authors of  political treatises, such as Diego Saavedra Fajardo), proyectistas and 
reformers of  the following century had in common this regalist argument: starting 
from the assumption that the clergy are unproductive in economic terms and that, at 
the same time, due to the lands in mortmain, withhold a significant amount of  
sources of  income from the tax authorities and society, the king had the right to 
                                                          
21 ARTOLA, La Hacienda, pp. 57–62. The tercias reales, the subsidio and the excusado were described as the 
«Three Graces». In addition to these contributions, there were the media-anata eclesiástica (corresponding 
to half  of  the first year’s beneficial income of  the high clergy) and the pensiones de mitras (one-third of  
the Episcopal incomes). 
22 J. H. ELLIOTT, Self-perception and decline in early seventeenth-century Spain, «Past and Present», 74 (1977), 
pp. 41–61; J. I GUTIÉRREZ NIETO, El pensamiento económico, político y social de los arbitristas, in Historia de 
España. El siglo del Quijote (1580–1680). Religión, filosofía, ciencia, edited by R. MENÉNDEZ PIDAL, vol. 
XXVI, 1, Madrid 1986, pp. 225–351; L. BAECK, Spanish economic thought: the school of  Salamanca and the 
arbitristas, «History of  Political Economy», 20, 3 (1988), pp. 381–408; C. PERROTTA, Early Spanish 
mercantilism: the first analysis of  underdevelopment, in Mercantilist Economics, edited by L. MAGNUSSON, 
London-Boston 1993; L. PERDICES, La economía política de la decadencia de Castilla en el siglo XVII. 
Investigaciones de los arbitristas sobre la naturaleza y causas de la riqueza de las naciones, Madrid 1996; N. 
GUASTI, La monarchia malata. L’arbitrismo e il Settecento spagnolo, in I Secoli d’Oro e i Lumi: processi di 
risemantizzazione, edited by M. G. PROFETI, Firenze 1998, pp. 55–115. 
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demand from the Church and the Pope not only a greater contributory effort, but 
also a reduction in the number of  clerics, in particular those belonging to the regular 
clergy. 
During Philip IV’s reign, the problem of  a fair distribution of  the tax burden 
between the Crowns of  Castile and Aragon was also tackled for the first time, but the 
attempt of  the Count-Duke of  Olivares to gain the contribution of  the Aragonian 
autonomous territories by means of  the unión de armas (1624–1626) failed miserably. 
Subsequently, with Portugal’s separation and the Catalan revolt of  1640–1652, the 
dynastic union upon which the “composite monarchy” was based ran the risk of  
dissolving.  
Generally speaking, apart from a few exceptions, the sixteenth-century 
Iberian thinkers dealing with economic and financial issues had as a theoretical frame 
of  reference the Aristotelian Political theory and the second Scholasticism (in 
particular, the School of  Salamanca reflected deeply on these issues). As a 
consequence, when the practical aspects of  the tax system are taken into 
consideration, the argumentative frame appears to be dominated by Thomism’s 
capital theses, beginning with distributive justice and the reason of  the state. From 
this point of  view, the true epistemological change occurs at the beginning of  the 
eighteenth century: of  course, it was not a sudden break, but the dynastic change and 
the replacement of  the administrative class – with the arrival of  officials from Italy 
(José Patiño was among the first ones), France (Jean Orry) and the Flemish Region 
(Count de Bergeyck and also Spanish-born but Flemish-educated officials, such as 
Gerónimo de Uztáriz) – certainly did not play a minor role in Spain’s openness to 
European debates. At the same time as the movement of  the novatores was born, a 
political-administrative culture partly different from the Habsburg one started to be 
developed.23 Although Anne Dubet, in line with the recent revision of  the Bourbons’ 
absolutism promoted by Jean-Frédéric Schaub, reaffirmed that in Spain’s 
administrative procedure there was no sharp break between the Austrias and the 
Bourbons era, if  we consider the cultural climate, it is evident that with Philip V a 
gradual change began, at least in the methodological frame of  economic and fiscal 
thought.24 As a matter of  fact, in the first decades of  the eighteenth century, 
economic and fiscal methodology started to be influenced by the language of  the 
nascent «science of  commerce». As Catherine Larrère has demonstrated for France, 
                                                          
23 A. MESTRE, Influjo europeo y herencia hispánica: Mayans y la Ilustración valenciana, Valencia 1987; G. 
STIFFONI, Verità della storia e ragioni del potere nella Spagna del primo Settecento, Milano 1989; ID., Progetti 
culturali alternativi e compromessi possibili nella cultura della Spagna di Ferdinando VI e Carlo III: la figura di 
Mayans, «Rivista storica italiana», 103, 1 (1991), pp. 57–137. See also J. I. ISRAEL, Radical Enlightenment. 
Philosophy and the making of  Modernity 1650–1750, Oxford 2001, pp. 528–540. As is known, during the 
reign of  Philip V, the Valencian scholar Gregorio Mayans tried to revitalize the tradition of  sixteenth-
century Catholic Humanism, while Gerónimo Feijoo based his ambitious project of  renewing Spanish 
culture on a selection of  those elements of  the baroque legacy that could be integrated into the new 
culture coming from France and Europe. 
24 J.-F. SCHAUB, La France espagnole. Les racines hispaniques de l’absolutisme français, Paris 2003; A. DUBET, 
Un estadista francés en la España de los Borbones. Juan Orry y las primeras reformas de Felipe V (1701–1706), 
Madrid 2008. See also H. KAMEN, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 1665–1700, London 1980; 
GUILLAMÓN ÁLVAREZ, La Guerra de Sucesión, pp. 529–542. On the role played by the venality of  the 
offices in the Bourbons’ fiscal policy, see F. ANDÚJAR CASTILLO, El sonido del dinero. Monarquía y 
venalidad en la España del siglo XVIII, Madrid 2004; ID., Necesidad y venalidad. España e Indias, 1704–1711, 
Madrid 2008; El poder del dinero. Ventas de cargos y honores en el Antiguo Régimen, edited by ID., M. FELICES 
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it was a «lexicon» which originated in natural law, and which was often hybridized 
with the more classical genre of  commercial treatises and with practical commercial 
expertise. Also in the Spain of  Philip V, there was a debate on three models of  
economic policy (reflecting as many political systems) which were already formalized 
at the end of  the seventeenth century: these were firstly, French Colbertism, 
secondly, the model of  the commerce d’économie or d’entrepôt embodied by the Republic 
of  the Seven United Provinces, and, lastly, the aggressive model represented by the 
English Navigation Act25. Among these three examples of  economic policy, 
Colbertism clearly achieved the greatest success among the Iberian proyectistas of  the 
time, so that Savary’s works – the Parfait Négociant (1675) and the Dictionnaire universel 
de commerce (1723) – and Vauban’s Dîme Royale (1707) became essential references for 
the ministers and officials of  the Bourbon monarchy. However, a pro-agrarianism 
line continued to circulate, promoted by a sector of  the Iberian arbitrismo and 
revitalized by the French current of  opinion against Louis XIV’s warmongering and 
mercantilist line (from Boisguilbert to Fénelon). In order to illustrate the change in 
perspective linked to the Bourbon succession, it is useful to compare two books that, 
although published within twenty-five years of  one another, can be taken as two 
significant indicators to measure the ongoing change: the Teatro monárquico de España 
(1700) by Pedro Portocarrero and the Theórica y Práctica de comercio y de marina (1724) 
by Gerónimo de Uztáriz.26 
The former is a typical political treatise in which the author – who was 
Patriarch of  the Indies and nephew of  the powerful cardinal Portocarrero, initially 
one of  the strongest supporters of  the Bourbon succession – condemns the 
excessive tax burden that threatens to turn the monarchs into tyrants. His reasoning 
appeals to the social contract theory inspired by Tacitism, Neostoicism and Foralism, 
now to the language of  the second Scholasticism (in particular of  the Jesuit school, 
since Mariana, Suárez and Ribadeneira are among the main sources of  the treatise): 
excessive and arbitrary taxes not only go against the original pact between sovereign 
and subjects, but also violate the rules of  distributive justice. By proposing again the 
already classical image of  an organicist Spanish society, Portocarrero limits himself  
to a condemnation of  the excessive privileges and immunities enjoyed by the 
privileged classes, but his polemic is to a large extent directed against nobility, and in 
particular against the venality of  noble titles. 
Completely different is the approach proposed by Uztáriz, a military engineer 
and native of  Navarre, who was familiar with the Flemish culture and with the circles 
of  contractors and financiers who would support Philip V during the first years of  
                                                          
25 Governare il Mondo. L'economia come linguaggio della politica nell'Europa del Settecento, edited by M. 
ALBERTONE, Milano 2009; Modelli d'oltre confine. Prospettive economiche e sociali negli antichi Stati italiani, 
edited by A. ALIMENTO, Roma 2009. Dutch commercial procedures started to be known at the 
beginning of  the eighteenth century primarily through the Mémoires touchant le négoce et la navigation des 
Hollandais (1717) by Pierre-Daniel Huet. Details about English trade legislation (beginning with the 
text of  the Navigation Act) and political arithmetic also passed to Spain through France, thanks to 
treatises such as Les intérêts de l’Angleterre malentendus dans la guerre présente (1704) by Jean Baptiste Dubos. 
26 P. PORTOCARRERO Y GUZMÁN, Teatro monárquico de España, Madrid, Juan García Infançon, 1700, 
modern edition edited by C. SANZ AYÁN, Madrid 1998; G. DE UZTÁRIZ, Theórica y práctica de comercio y 
de marina, Madrid, n. p., 1724; 2nd edition Madrid, A. Sanz, 1742 (anastatic reprint edited by G. 
FRANCO, Madrid 1968: I will use this edition). 
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his reign.27 As is clear from the title, the subject of  his work is trade considered as a 
form of  economic policy and following universal rules (the teórica) that governments 
should consider when taking measures concerning productive and commercial 
activities related to specific contexts (the práctica). The analysis of  the link the tax 
system and the development of  manufactures and exchanges is the central theme of  
Uztáriz’s treatise, but it is based on an epistemological grid different from the 
Tomistic one. In fact, although Uztáriz seems to be still tied both to the arbitristic 
treatises and to the seventeenth-century political doctrine (Moncada, Fernández de 
Navarrete and Saavedra Fajardo), he replaces «dynastic interest» with an «economic 
interest» which follows a different logic although its aim is maintaining the national 
monetary reserves and strengthening the monarchy’s naval and military forces. Rather 
than an approach that scholars describe as «mercantilist» or Colbertist, founded on 
customs protectionism, what marks the difference between the analyses of  
Portocarrero and Uztáriz is the awareness that governments must now plan their 
policy on the basis of  the exact knowledge of  the demographic and economic bases 
of  their territories: if  data on population and manufacturing are not available 
through consistent statistical surveys (following the British method of  political 
arithmetic), it is impossible to achieve an active balance of  trade, which is the true 
pillar of  the military power and political balances in a Europe plagued by dynastic 
wars of  succession.28 Ultimately, Uztáriz, as with many proyectistas of  the early part of  
the century, tries to give specificity and dignity to his economic considerations by 
grounding them on pre-scientific bases. As a consequence, in Spain too a process was 
started that would lead to the birth of  the new discipline of  economics, which only 
                                                          
27 R. CALLE SAIZ, La hacienda pública en España. El pensamiento financiero español durante la época mercantilista: 
Uztáriz y Ulloa, «Revista de Economía Política», 75 (1977), pp. 7–28; R. FERNÁNDEZ DURÁN, Gerónimo 
de Uztáriz (1670–1732). Una política económica para Felipe V, Madrid 1999. Uztáriz climbed the Bourbon 
administration until he became secretary of  the Consejo de Indias and member of  the Junta de Comercio y 
Moneda during 1729. On Uztáriz’s foreign sources, see ibid., pp. 315–390. 
28 “Machiavellian” perspective (that is, including commercial competition in the context of  a struggle 
for political hegemony or, in the best case, for the achievement of  a balance of  power) or a 
philosophical framework inspired by Aristotle. See C. LARRÈRE, L’invention de l’économie au XVIIIe siècle, 
Paris 1992, pp. 95–134. Even Augustinism, and in particular its Jansenist interpretation, would 
represent, along with Utilitarianism, one of  the doctrines inspiring seventeenth-century economic 
reflection, since both analyze and explain Epicureanism, Augustinism, and Republicanism and, thus, 
would arise from the hybridization of  “old materials” with some new theoretical dynamics or 
“mechanics” of  human passions. Therefore, the birth of  political economy was due to the 
combination of  a variety of  philosophical currents, namely Natural Law, Aristotelianism, Thomism, 
Machiavellianism, Utilitarianism, and epistemological acquisitions. On this point, see also I. HONT, 
Jealousy of  trade. International competition and the Nation-State in historical perspective, Cambridge Mass. – 
London 2005; J. ROBERTSON, The case for the Enlightenment. Scotland and Naples 1680–1760, Cambridge 
2005; ID., “Enlightenment, Public Sphere and Political Economy”, in L’économie politique et la sphère 
publique dans le débat des Lumières, edited by J. ASTIGARRAGA et J. USOZ, Madrid 2013, pp. 9–32. Both 
scholars identify Melon as the key-author of  the economic and reforming movement of  the late 
seventeenth century, in particular in the Scottish and Neapolitan contexts. His Essai politique sur le 
commerce (1734) proposes an organic synthesis of  the two key elements of  the political economy of  the 
Enlightenment, namely Epicureanism and Augustinism. At the same time, Melon praises commercial 
society (along with political arithmetic, as the guiding instrument for legislators), a moderate 
commercial liberism and luxury, and ends up anticipating Montesquieu’s conclusions about the link 
between political freedom and commercial development. On the circulation of  the Essai in Spain, see 
J. ASTIGARRAGA, La dérangeante découverte de l’autre: les (més)aventures de l’Essai politique sur le commerce 
(1734) de Jean-François Melon dans l’Espagne du XVIIIe siècle, «Revue d’Histoire Moderne et 
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thirty years after the publication of  the Theórica would gain scientific status in France 
thanks to Gournay’s group and to Phisiocracy.29 
It is clear that these epistemological and methodological changes also had 
repercussions with respect to dealing with the thorny question of  the function of  the 
clergy. Undoubtedly, Uztáriz, like many of  his contemporaries, seems to be cautious 
on this subject and avoids the use of  theoretical frameworks borrowed from the 
Natural Law thought, which he must have known about during his long stay in 
Flanders. However, the question of  the taxation of  the clergy clearly needed to be 
addressed on the basis of  a pragmatic and substantially laic (in the broad sense of  the 
term) attitude, that is to say, by rethinking the role that the ecclesiastics had to play in 
a rapidly changing reality, where the power of  states was measured according both to 
the prosperity of  the estado llano, that is, of  the productive classes (farmers, artisans 
and merchants), and to the reduction of  the unproductive classes, among whom 
Uztáriz includes the majority of  the clergy. Therefore, rather than the request to 
reduce the number of  clerics as endorsed by Fernández de Navarrete, what is more 
interesting is the sharp condemnation (unthinkable only a few decades before) of  the 
«sopa de los conventos» which was seen to incentivize unemployment and laziness in 
an artificial way. In other words, the late medieval Catholic assistencialism had been 
clearly rejected, whereas there was an increasing need for the process – skillfully 
studied by Michel Foucault – of  the progressive disciplining of  the labour force in 
order to increase national production. Certainly, it is not by chance that Uztáriz, like 
the majority of  the proyectistas and Bourbon officials of  the early eighteenth century, 
considered Colbertism and the French economic policy pursued by Luis XIV 
(although adapted to the Iberian economic, political and legal specificities) as a model 
to follow and imitate, at least as far as its basic guidelines were concerned.30  
 
2. FISCAL REFORM IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SPAIN (1701–1759) 
The guidelines for the fiscal reforms carried out or simply planned in 
eighteenth century Spain can be analyzed in the context of  the policies adopted by 
the Bourbon sovereigns Philip V (1701-1746), Ferdinand VI (1746–1759), Charles III 
                                                          
29 On the economic thought and the reform proposals of  Vincent de Gournay, see A. E. MURPHY, Le 
développement des idées économiques en France (1750–1756), «Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine», 
XXXIII (1986), pp. 521–541; S. MEYSSONNIER, La Balance et l’Horloge. La genèse de la pensée libérale en 
France au XVIIIe siècle, Paris 1989; J.-C. PERROT, Une histoire intellectuelle de l’économie politique, Paris 1992; 
P. STEINER, La ‘Science Nouvelle’ de l’économie politique, Paris 1998. It was not by chance that Uztáriz’s 
Theórica was translated into French by one of  the most brilliant members of  the group, François 
Véron de Forbonnais. See N. GUASTI, Forbonnais e Plumard traduttori di Uztáriz e Ulloa, «Pensiero 
economico italiano», 8, 2 (2001), pp. 71–97; ID., Véron de Forbonnais and Plumard de Dangeul as Translators 
of  Uztáriz and Ulloa, «History of  European Ideas», 40, 8 (2014), pp. 1067–1086; H. C. CLARK, Compass 
of  Society: Commerce and Absolutism in Old Regime France, Lanham 2007, pp. 129–144; ARNAULT 
SKORNICKI, L’économiste, la cour et la patrie. L'économie politique dans la France des Lumières, Paris 2011; Le 
cercle de Gournay. Savoirs économiques et pratiques administratives en France au milieu du XVIIIe siècle, edited by 
L. CHARLES, F. LEFEBVRE, C. THERE, Paris 2011; A. ALIMENTO, La concurrence comme politique moderne: la 
contribution de l’école de Gournay à la naissance d’une sphère publique dans la France des années 1750–1760, in 
L´économie politique et la sphère publique dans le débat des Lumières, edited by J. ASTIGARRAGA, J. USOZ, 
Madrid 2013, pp. 213–227. 
30 On Colbertism and its european fortune see P. MINARD, La fortune du colbertisme. État et industrie dans 
las France des Lumie ̀res, Paris 1998; Modelli d’oltre confine. Prospettive economiche e sociali negli antichi Stati 
italiani, edited by A. ALIMENTO, Roma 2009. 
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(1759–1788) and Charles IV (1788–1808). It would be legitimate to add a further 
phase, corresponding to the age of  the early liberalism and of  the Restoration; that 
is, the period from the constitution promulgated by the Cádiz Cortes (1812) to the 
Liberal Triennium of  1820–1823. This is not only because in recent years the 
periodization of  the Spanish Ilustración has been extended to include the second 
decade of  the nineteenth century, but also because, more concretely, in those years 
the debate on the reform of  the tax system continued along the lines already drawn 
during the first half  of  the eighteenth century.31 Anyway, the year 1808 is a very 
significant demarcation moment in Iberian history due to the double abdication of  
Charles IV and Ferdinand VII imposed by Napoleon, which led to the dissolution of  
the Bourbon state and to the establishment of  a double political power (the power 
embodied by the patriotic Juntas and the Bonapartist power supported by the 
afrancesados or Frenchified government officials). Therefore, I think it is legitimate 
also from the point of  view of  tax reforms, to consider it as a watershed year, a 
terminus ad quem of  a long phase that had begun with the early eighteenth century 
dynastic change. 
In the years after the War of  the Spanish Succession, the political earthquake 
caused by the conflict offered the first Bourbon governments the opportunity to 
tackle the reform of  the various state entities that made up the monarchy.32 By 
abolishing the fueros (or charters of  regional privileges) of  the kingdoms forming the 
Crown of  Aragon (the Kingdom of  Aragon, the Kingdom of  Valencia, the 
Principality of  Catalonia, the Kingdom of  Majorca and the Kingdom of  Sardinia) 
and by modelling the administration on that of  Castile, the new dynasty came to 
grips with the problem of  renovating the respective tax systems. Actually, among the 
main objectives of  the so-called Nueva Planta (1707–1716), there was an explicit 
willingness on the part of  the Bourbon ministers to introduce a tax equivalence, by 
taking the product of  the Castilian Rentas Provinciales as a parameter. Undoubtedly, the 
most important act of  the Equivalente, the general fiscal reorganization of  the states 
of  the former Crown of  Aragon, was the catastro established in Catalonia in 1716 by 
the then-Intendant and future prime minister of  Spain (although native of  Milan) 
José Patiño.33  
                                                          
31 J. FONTANA, La quiebra de la Monarquía absoluta, 1814–1820, Barcelona 20025; ID., Hacienda y Estado en 
la crisis final del Antiguo Régimen español: 1823–1833, Madrid 2001²; R. MARTÍNEZ DE MONTAOS ET AL., 
El pensamiento hacendístico liberal en las Cortes de Cádiz, Instituto de estudios fiscales, edited by F. LÓPEZ 
CASTELLANO, Madrid 1999; M. ARTOLA, Los orígines de la España contemporánea, Madrid 2000³. 
32 J. LYNCH, Borboun Spain, 1700–1808, London 1988 pp. 22–115; C. DE CASTRO, A la sombra de Felipe 
V. José de Grimaldo, ministro responsable (1703–1726), Madrid 2004; La pérdida de Europa. La guerra de 
Sucesión por la Monarquía de España, edited by A. ÁLVAREZ-OSSORIO ALVARIÑO, B. J. GARCÍA-GARCÍA, 
V. LEÓN SAINZ, Madrid 2007. For a long-term vision, see Las monarquías española y francesa (siglos XVI–
XVIII). ¿Dos modelos políticos?, edited by A. DUBET, J. J. RUIZ IBÁÑEZ, Madrid 2010. We are currently 
witnessing a major historiographical revision concerning Philip V’s absolutist policy. In particular, the 
premise that the first Bourbon would have pursued a consistent reform project inspired by absolutism, 
borrowed from the monarchy of  Louis XIV, has been questioned. It has been noted, for instance, that 
the Bourbon Nueva Planta could not totally erase the vestiges of  the composite and polysynodal 
monarchy of  the Habsburgs. 
33 E. ESCARTÍN, El Catastro catalán: teoría y realdidad, «Pedralbes» 1 (1981), pp. 253–265; A. SEGURA I 
MAS, El catastro de Patiño en Cataluña (1715–1845), in El Catastro en España, edited by ID., vol. 1, Madrid 
1984, pp. 31–44; I. PULIDO BUENO, José Patiño. El inicio del Gobierno político-económico ilustrado en España, 
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The catastro was a fixed apportioned tax imposed on real estate (through the 
tasa real) and on income from movable wealth (by means of  the tasa personal). In the 
first case, a scale of  thirty-two types of  land was established (according to quality), 
on which was levied a rate of  10% on the earnings produced. The estimates had 
been made by local authorities on the basis of  self-certification, which had made 
possible the concealment of  assets as well as outright frauds both of  which benefited 
the oligarchies. Later follow-up audits carried out by the Intendancy staff  did not 
manage to rectify such injustices. However, the catastro also taxed «lo personal», 
basically represented by the earnings of  wage-earners, artisans and merchants. In this 
latter case, the estimates had been based on annual working days (with a lower limit 
of  100 days and an upper limit of  180 days), and two rates (8.5 and 10%) were to be 
applied in proportion to each category’s presumed income. Nevertheless, the catastro 
was not a differential tax but an apportioned tax, since Madrid had decreed that the 
Principality of  Catalonia should pay a fixed amount (which was eventually reduced to 
900,000 pesos) to be distributed among the various communities; at the local level, the 
distribution was carried out by magistrates, mayors and guilds. Fixed apportioned 
taxes were also established in the other kingdoms of  the Crown of  Aragon: the única 
contribución in Aragon, the equivalente in Valencia, the talla in the Balearic Islands and 
the donativo regio in Sardinia.34 Although the cadastre was based on the declarations of  
the taxpayers, the quotas of  every single community were set by the Intendant 
without considering individual incomes, while the allotment of  the quotas to be 
allotted to each household was entrusted to local authorities. In conclusion, even if  
the philosophy of  the Catalan catastro seems to have been inspired by the idea (later 
dismissed) of  a tax proportionality, the model for the other taxes is surely older and 
close to the Castilian tradition. The greater modernity of  the Catalan catastro also 
depended on the fact that in 1716, Patiño drew his inspiration from three coeval 
French models: the first one was the taille réelle, a property tax imposed on some 
French provinces (Provence, Dauphiné, Languedoc, High-Guyenne) which was 
calculated on the basis of  a local “cadastre” or cadastral register called compoix. The 
second model certainly was the dixième approved by the Sun-King in 1710, which was 
a tax of  10% on revenues deriving from real estate, wages, and profits from movable 
property. Lastly, he was very familiar with the treatise Dîme Royale written by the 
Marshal of  France, Vauban, in 1707, which illustrated the project of  a ten-percent-
tax on gross product, partially carried out three years later.  
The many doubts regarding the Catalan catastro began to be alleviated in the 
second half  of  the eighteenth century, when many observers attributed the economic 
development of  Catalonia precisely to the catastro.35 In fact, the fixed global quota, 
which in the first decades had been an excessive burden, was reduced over the 
century. It is therefore not surprising that in 1845 the Spanish government abolished 
                                                          
34 J. PRO RUIZ, Estado, geometría y propriedad. Los orígenes del catastro en España (1715–1941), Madrid 1992, 
pp. 1–11; P. RUIZ TORREs, El equivalente valenciano, in El Catastro en España, 1, pp. 47–59; A. PEIRÓ, La 
Única Contribución, ibid. pp. 75–87; P. GARCÍA TROBAT, El Equivalente de alcabalas, un nuevo impuesto en el 
Reino de Valencia durante el XVIII, Valencia 1999. On the Sardinian donativo regio of  150,000 pesos, 
launched by the intendant Clemente de Aguilar on 25 July 1718, see E. ESCARTÍN, Notas sobre la Nueva 
Planta en Cataluña y Cerdeña (1717–1720), in Atti del XIV Congresso della Corona d’Aragona. La Corona 
d’Aragona in Italia, edited by M. G. MELONI, O. SCHENA, vol. 4, Sassari 1997, pp. 133–143. 
35 R. CALLE SAIZ, La hacienda pública en España. El proyecto de Vauban y su influencia sobre el pensamiento 
financiero de Zabala y Auñón, «Revista de Economía Política», 77 (1977), pp. 7–28. 
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the alcabala and extended the Catalan catastro to the whole country.36 However, this 
increasing and protracted fortune was arguably the result of  another factor of  
continuity in Spanish history, namely, the power of  the big landowners and 
landholders, who easily managed the system of  self-certifications and the local 
allotment of  the fixed quota, and could therefore perpetuate their socio-economic, 
but also political, supremacy through fiscal pressure.  
Ultimately, the Nueva Planta established for the first time a taxation 
equivalence between the Crowns of  Castile and Aragon. However, the fact remains 
that the «administrative reformism» of  the first Bourbon sovereign did not produce 
radical upheavals in matters of  taxation, at least in Castile. In fact, the war 
commitments which aimed at recovering the Italian territories and which studded the 
entire reign of  Philip V did not allow the sovereign or his ministers to revolutionize 
the tax system. Compared with the time of  Charles II, the millones underwent no 
change, either in revenue or in the method of  collection; the servicios were nominally 
the same (the 24, 2,5 and 9 millones for six years, as already set in 1632) and the 
collection system, founded on the encabezamiento and tax-farming, was identical. Only 
in 1725, after having carried out several censuses,37 did the government decide to 
revise the quotas and rules of  the encabezamientos: since then, every taxpayer would 
have to draw up an annual statement of  the wheat, livestock, wine and oil in his 
possession after harvest. In other words, until the fourth decade of  the eighteenth 
century, the attempt was made to administer the system inherited from the Austrias as 
efficiently as possible and without too many alterations. In this context, an exception 
was represented by two important reforms: the abolition of  border customs – the so-
called puertos secos – between the Crowns of  Castile and Aragon (decreed in 1708 and 
again in 1711 and 1714); and the unification of  all the alcabalas, cientos and millones of  
a given province under the control of  a single tax-farmer (promoted by Jean Orry in 
1713 and enforced in 1725). The latter measure undoubtedly was a notable step 
forward on the road to the rationalization of  the system, which would be completed 
in 1749, when Ensenada would definitively abolish tax-farming and launch the única 
contribución.38 To sum up, in the first half  of  the eighteenth century, Castilian taxation 
                                                          
36 P. GARCÍA TROBAT, A forgotten result of  the Spanish War of  Succession: the cadastre and its fiscal effects on the 
Crown of  Aragón, in Kataster und moderner Staat in Italien, Spanien und Frankreich (18. Jh.), edited by E. V. 
HAYEN, Baden-Baden 2001, pp. 193–216. The Impuesto sobre el consumo de especies determinadas of  1845 
replaced both the Castilian Rentas provinciales and the three taxation systems of  the Equivalente of  the 
Crown of  Aragon. See F. ESTAPÉ RODRÍGUEZ, La reforma tributaria de 1845, Madrid 1971. 
37 At the beginning of  the century, the new dynasty had promoted some vecindarios, or population 
censuses, which also had the objective of  determining to what extent the distribution of  the 
apportioned taxes connected with the encabezamientos was correct: the demographic investigations 
ordered by Grimaldo in1708 and by the Prince of  Campoflorido in 1717 (vecindarios later included in 
Uztáriz’s Theórica) were of  great significance. 
38 ARTOLA, La Hacienda, pp. 254 and 258. In the last years of  Philip V’s reign, the Minister of  Finance 
Campillo tried to carry on the policy of  rationalization of  tax collection, relying on the direct 
collection of  provincial taxes by the Bourbon administration: as a matter of  fact, between 1741 and 
1742, tax farming contracts were not renewed in five Castilian provinces. This line was also followed 
by Ensenada at the beginning of  Ferdinand VI’s government and culminated in the decree of  11 
October 1749 (regarded as a preamble to the única contribución) which provided for the passage of  all 
the twenty-two Castilian provinces from the regime of  tax farming to direct collection: since then, the 
intendants (whose powers were strengthened and clarified) were the only ones responsible for 
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continued to be based on the late-medieval consumption taxes (as in the case of  the 
alcabala), on customs duties and on the inefficient encabezamiento.39 
This continuity also had repercussions with regard to the economic analyses 
undertaken, since, in the early eighteenth century, only a few authors – apart from the 
significant case of  Zavala – considered the other aspect of  the debate, that is, the 
need to correct the imbalances in the primary sector. Uztáriz, for instance, 
considered the English corn laws so «repugnantes», that he did not deal with the 
crisis of  the Iberian agricultural sector, nor did he examine in depth the issue of  the 
food policy or of  the liberalization of  grain trade.40 In other words, during the reign 
of  Philip V, the reorganization of  the financial system was not organically bound 
with the other important issue that characterizes the eighteenth century European 
economic debate, namely agrarian reform, but rather almost exclusively with the 
burning issue (especially after the Peace of  Utrecht) of  commercial policy and the 
revival of  the Castilian manufacturing system.41  
Nevertheless, in these years, the regalist polemic against the Church gradually 
intensified. Its undisputed champion was Melchor de Macanaz.42 It was not by 
chance that fiscal pressure to the detriment of  the clergy had been increased since 
the beginning of  the reign of  the first Bourbon king, due to the continuous state of  
war of  the monarchy until the forties. It has been amply demonstrated that, during 
the War of  Succession, the contribution, which included a financial component, 
offered by the Castilian clergy to the cause of  Philip V, was indeed decisive.43 
However, even before the end of  the conflict, a growing opposition on the part of  
the episcopate and the regular orders coalesced against royal taxation and developed 
into a clamorous protest by one of  the prelates, Luis Belluga, bishop of  Cartagena, 
who had been the strongest supporter of  the Bourbons. In November 1713, he 
addressed a violent memorial of  protest to denounce the systematic violation of  
ecclesiastical immunity, in particular of  the exemption from the payment of  the tax 
on salt, which had been reiterated by the bull issued by Urban VIII on June 5, 1641. 
The pugnacious bishop went as far as to deny that the Crown had the sovereign right 
to exploit the commercialization of  salt, and reminded that the greatness of  states 
                                                          
39 Throughout the eighteenth century, contractors and the Bourbon administration continued to 
follow the practice (that had become standard) of  raising the provincial quotas essentially through the 
sisas. Only in the event that the amount requested had not been reached, did they rely on the 
repartimiento, that is, the taxation of  property, profits, volume of  trade and livestock of  all the vecinos 
residentes, including the clergy. This system, apart from ensuring the exemption of  rentiers during the 
first phase of  the collection (that of  the encabezamiento), allowed landowners a large degree of  tax 
avoidance, since, as Zavala complained, the local poderosos controlled – now directly, now through 
clientelism – the municipal assemblies in charge of  assessing the income of  each fuego (or household). 
See ARTOLA, La Hacienda, p. 256 and 261. 
40 UZTÁRIZ, Theórica y Práctica, ch. XXVIII, p. 67a. Aside from Zavala, the other author of  the early 
eighteenth century who largely devoted himself  to the examination of  agriculture and, consequently 
to a cadastre-based tax reform was Alvaro Navia Osorio y Vigil de Quiñones, Marquis of  Santa Cruz 
de Marcenado. See his Rapsodia económico-política monárquica, Madrid, Marín, 1732 (anastatic reprint 
Oviedo 1984). 
41 HONT, Jealousy of  trade, p. 77. 
42 The influence that his works (most of  which circulated handwritten) exerted on the regalism of  the 
late eighteenth century still has to be fully assessed. 
43 D. GONZÁLEZ CRUZ, Guerra de religión entre príncipes católicos: el discurso del cambio dinástico en España y 
América (1700–1714), Madrid 2002; D. MARTI ́N MARCOS, El Papado y la Guerra de Sucesio ́n española, 
Madrid 2011. 
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had always been directly proportional to the respect given to the immunities of  the 
clergy, and that these had been guaranteed by canon and civil law. This, he argued, 
was demonstrated by the fact that, after the reign of  Philip II, Providence had 
punished with military setbacks any new tax imposed on the Iberian clergy without 
papal consent.44 Furthermore, the bishop justified such privileges for the clergy on 
the basis of  the services of  spiritual care and material assistance that they provided 
to society. In conclusion, he stated that with the subsidio, the First Estate paid the 
Hacienda at least one-tenth of  its own income: much more than the nobility. This was 
a full-blown defense of  the supremacy of  spiritual over temporal power and of  
ecclesiastical over royal law. 
The growing discontent of  the clergy, along with the difficult issue of  the 
papal recognition of  the legitimacy of  the succession of  Philip V to the Spanish 
Crown, led the king to seek an agreement with the Holy See and the Iberian Church. 
He followed the political path of  the concordats. Thus, after the rupture of  
diplomatic relations with Rome in 1709 (which allowed the Bourbon administration 
to administer vacant ecclesiastical benefices, and the episcopate to grant matrimonial 
dispensations without turning to the Apostolic Datary), the relations between the 
Spanish monarchy and the Holy See were normalized between 1715 and 1723. In 
fact, with the bull Apostolici ministerii issued in 1723, Benedict XIII cancelled some of  
the privileges of  regular orders, adumbrating the possibility of  reducing even fiscal 
immunities. Later, the concordat of  26 September 1737 was signed: here the article 8 
provided that all assets acquired under the regime of  mortmain from then on were 
liable for the same taxes as secular properties. However, – as all the regalist thinkers 
and the members of  the Junta del patronato (established in 1735) would later complain 
– de facto this article was not complied with, nor did the agreement resolve the 
longstanding problem of  benefices.45 So, in the last period of  Philip V’s reign, new 
negotiations were begun, eventually leading to the signature of  a second concordat in 
February 1753. This should have resolved both the long diatribe concerning the 
Crown’s claim to universal patronage over the Iberian Church and the issues 
concerning the so-called “papal reserves” on benefices.46 With this agreement, 
Benedict XIV yielded to the Spanish sovereign the royal patronage over the Spanish 
Church (thus extending the jurisdiction he already exercised over the Church of  
Granada and the American church), and abolished the papal reserves of  the Curia 
and the nuncio. From a practical point of  view, this meant that the king became 
                                                          
44 L. BELLUGA, Memorial que da a su Magestad el obispo de Cartagena. Sobre los acreciminetos e impuestos en la sal 
[…], Murcia, S. A. Mesnier, [1713]. See also I. MARTÍN, Figura y pensamiento del cardenal Belluga a través de 
su Memorial antirregalista a Felipe V, Murcia 1960; Estudios sobre el Cardenal Belluga, edited by C. M. 
CREMADES, Murcia 1985. 
45 The last attempt to enforce this provision was made by Squillace in 1760. The minister of  Charles 
III remitted the taxes (in particular the alcabala) on immovable property passed under the mortmain 
regime which had not been paid until then, with the provision that they would be paid from the first 
of  January of  that year onwards. On the other hand, even article 5 of  the Concordat of  1737, which 
provided that the Spanish Church would pay to the Hacienda a new subsidy of  150,000 ducats every 
five years, had not been fully complied with. 
46 R. OLAECHEA, Las relaciones hispano-romanas en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, Zaragoza 1965; T. 
EGIDO, El Regalismo y relaciones Iglesia - Estado en el siglo XVIII, in Historia de la Iglesia en España, edited by 
R. GARCÍA VILLOSLADA, vol. IV, Madrid 1979, pp. 162–177. On the “spiritual financial system” 




Cromohs 19/2014 - p. 35 
master of  the system of  benefices and of  all ecclesiastical dignities47, and that from 
that time on he could more directly control the episcopate. From an economic point 
of  view, the most far-reaching consequence was the significant reduction of  the 
financial drainage carried on by the Curia, since all life annuities and bank coupons 
issued by the Roman banks on the incomes of  Spanish benefices were cancelled48. In 
addition, by cancelling a series of  heavy taxes (anatas, medias anatas, quindenios and also 
espolios and frutos de vacantes), an entire branch of  taxation connected to the system of  
benefices was eliminated.49 
This small revolution, however, did not totally interrupt the money drainage 
benefiting Rome, because the concordat did not undermine the right of  Roman 
tribunals (in particular the Penitenzieria and Dataria) to grant absolutions and 
dispensations, especially those related to marriage. In the following years, all requests 
of  this kind continued to pass not only through the usual institutional channel 
represented by the Agencia de preces, but also through many private agents residing in 
Rome.50 This is the reason why the jurisdictionalists of  the second half  of  the 
eighteenth century continued to support one of  the strongest rhetorical arguments 
of  the Iberian regalist tradition, namely that of  the drain of  Spanish economic 
resources in favour of  Rome51 (which argument Juan de Chumacero and Domingo 
Pimentel had already submitted to Urban VIII during their famous embassy to Rome 
in 1633). 
 
3. THE CASTILIAN CADASTRE 
An important turning point in the Iberian fiscal reformism was the 
introduction of  the Castilian cadastre, as a basis of  a single tax (or única contribución), 
according to the project advanced by the minister of  Hacienda, Marquis of  the 
Ensenada, between 1747 and the mid-fifties.52 By the formula of  the única contribución, 
he did not mean the reduction of  all taxes to a single one, but rather the 
“unification” of  direct taxation into two branches (“real” or upon property, and 
                                                          
47 It was a total of  50,000 ecclesiastical benefices, of  which 20,000 were “simple” or chaplaincies with 
rents attached, and 12,000 well-endowed (canonries, various prebends, etc..). In compensation, the 
pontiff  maintained the right to appoint 52 benefices in thirty dioceses. 
48 These coupons were a sort of  mortgage on the incomes from benefices: as a matter of  fact, Roman 
bankers used to grant to the holders of  benefices advances on the incomes which they would receive 
in the first six years of  ownership. 
49 Significantly, the second concordat is linked with the important reform of  the bank system (1748–
1752), the Real Giro. See I. PULIDO BUENO, El Real Giro de España, Huelva 1994. 
50 After the concordat, however, the administrative link between the Chamber of  the Council of  
Castile and the Roman Agencia de preces became stronger. In 1778 the government managed to impose 
on the Curia a tariff  of  the individual preces (intercessions). 
51 Q. ALDEA, Iglesia y Estado en el siglo XVII (ideario político-eclesiástico), «Miscelánea Comillas», 37 (1961), 
pp. 152–354. 
52 Zenón de Somodevilla, Marquis of  the Ensenada, in his youth had collaborated with Patiño. 
Therefore, he had direct experience of  the vices and virtues of  the Catalan cadastre. During the 
thirties, Ensenada, as an officer in the military administration, had followed the future Charles III in 
his war campaigns through Italy and on this occasion he came to know the latest Italian cadastres, in 
particular that of  Piedmont, which was based on categories of  land use (1698–1716), the geometric 
and per-parcel one applied by Victor Amadeus II in the Duchy of  Savoy (1728–1738) and the 
analogous Milanese project developed by the Giunta del censimento (Census Board) between 1718 and 
1733 on the basis of  surveys and cartographic data. Philip V appointed him secretario de Hacienda in 
1743. See J. L. GÓMEZ URDÁÑEZ, El proyecto reformista de Ensenada, Lleida 1996. 
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personal) already provided for in the four tax systems launched in the former Crown 
of  Aragon, and in particular in the Catalan catastro. In other words, Ensenada never 
proposed the abolishment of  all indirect taxes (e.g. customs duties), but only the 
Castilian consumption taxes – alcabalas, cientos and millones – that were collected 
through the encabezamientos and the sisas. At the base of  the project, however, there 
was the will to move the fiscal axis from indirect to direct collection: the path 
followed was that of  taxing the gross product of  all real estate, which meant not 
diverting from tax liability the investments made by owners or tenants (that shortly 
afterwards Physiocrats would define as avances foncières). 
With regard to the criteria of  the levy, Ensenada kept the old concept, 
applied in the former Crown of  Aragon, of  the minimum fixed quota that the 
Hacienda would have to collect. In order to avoid fiscal bankruptcy, initially this 
amount had to be at least equivalent to the profitability of  the Rentas Provinciales, 
estimated at around 120 million reales de vellón. On the other hand, the rate to be 
applied to each taxpayer’s individual incomes from real estate and movable properties 
(which was actually the única contribución) could be set only after the end of  the 
cadastral operations, when the total income of  each taxpayer would be determined 
and capitalized from a maximum of  10 to a minimum of  5%.53 
Although the única contribución (which should have been calculated on the basis 
of  the cadastre) remained unenforced, this attempt to reorganize the Castilian tax 
system on the basis of  equal distribution was not forgotten and periodically revived 
until the first half  of  the nineteenth century.54 Furthermore, cadastral operations 
caused an acceleration and, above all, a reset of  the debate, since the many 
opponents of  cadastre-based taxation were forced to propose alternative collecting 
models allowing the preservation of  the guiding principle of  the única contribución, 
namely tax proportionality and distributive fairness.55 This meant that, since then, all 
                                                          
53 In his famous Representación to Ferdinando VI of  1751, Ensenada reiterated the argument that the 
economic decline of  the monarchy depended essentially on the «rentas provinciales, no tanto por la 
cantidad que producen como por el método en su administración y excessivos gastos en su exacción, 
pues […] las paga todo pobre y no todos los ricos». Thus, the only remedy would have been the 
passing of  the «única contribución en que se trabaxa ya que la experiencia de Francia y otras partes, no 
desmentida en Cataluña, ha acreditado que es el medio de hacer contribuir el vasallo a proporción de 
lo que tiene y gana, con justicia y claridad, fixando reglas para subir y baxar esta renta con 
proporcionada equidad». See D. OZANAM, Representación del marqués de la Ensenada a Fernando VI (1751), 
«Cuadernos de Investigación Histórica», 4 (1980), pp. 67–124, esp. p. 100. 
54 A. MATILLA TASCÓN, La Única Contribución y el Catastro de la Ensenada, Madrid 1947; J. HERNÁNDEZ 
ANDREU, La Única Contribución del Marqués de la Ensenada y el impuesto único de la escuela fisiócrata, «Moneda 
y Crédito», 117 (1971), pp. 67–79; PRO RUIZ, Estado, geometría y propriedad, pp. 12–23; C. CALVO 
ALONSO, El catastro de la Ensenada. Proyecto de Única Contribución en la Corona de Castilla, in El catastro en 
España, 1, pp. 89–110; C. CAMARERO BULLÓN, El debate de la Única Contribución. Catastrar las Castillas. 
1749, Madrid 1993; EAD., The Cadastre of  the Crown of  Castille in the Mid-18th Century, in Kataster und 
moderner Staat, pp. 167–191; El catastro de Ensenada. Magna averiguación fiscal para alivio de los vasallos y mejor 
conocimiento de los Reinos, 1749–1756, edited by I. DURÁN BOO, C. CAMARO BULLÓN, Madrid 2002. 
55 Among the alternative proposals advanced in these years, it is worth mentioning the one that Martín 
de Loynaz, then director of  the renta de tabaco, addressed to Ensenada in May 1749 (see his Instrucción 
que para la subrogación de las rentas provinciales en una sola contribución [...], in Miscelánea económico-política, pp. 
181–216). Loynaz recommended the application of  a project, based on the Dutch model, presented in 
1650 by José González, who was then a member of  the Board of  Finance: a «regalía de molienda de 
granos». In short, the official suggested the replacement of  all the Rentas provinciales (including royal 
monopolies) and the three tax systems of  the Crown of  Aragon with a flour-milling tax, to be 
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the Spanish ministers, officials and proyectistas shared a common perspective (that only 
the latent bankruptcy of  the nineties called into question): taxation no longer 
appeared as only one aspect of  the governments’ policy (as expressed by the 
proyectistas of  the early eighteenth century), but had to be regarded as one of  the 
drivers of  economic development. Therefore, tax collection should not be limited to 
the ensuring of  revenues, but in addition should help economic growth, by moving 
the levy from the manufacturing and producing classes to those who were 
unproductive and living on private incomes.56  
Within one month of  communicating his proposal to the king (on 10 
October 1749), Ensenada was able to convince him to sign the decree introducing 
the única contribución. The royal document included an instrucción (or set of  
instructions) with forty-one items indicating the institutional instruments, the 
method and the criteria of  the cadastral survey. Regarding the first point, operations 
were to be directed at central level by a Junta de única contribución established for the 
occasion and presided over by the Minister of  Finance himself; at the provincial 
level, the figure in charge of  the operations was the intendente, a position introduced 
by the new dynasty on the French model: therefore, twenty-two intendentes (one for 
province), answering directly to the Royal Central Commission, were appointed with 
the task of  presiding over the provincial cadastral commissions.57 The local courts or 
Audiencias would provide the necessary staff  for data recording. The audit would be 
extended to two levels: individual and municipal. In the first case, every person, 
natural or legal, belonging to any class or social status, had to provide a sworn 
statement of  one’s own assets: among natural persons, there were also included 
convents, monasteries, cathedral chapters, Episcopal seats, confraternities, hospitals 
and hermitages. Common goods were part of  the same category, since they were 
collectively owned by each village. At the municipal level, the city councils were asked 
forty questions about the territory and its products, their prices, costs of  production, 
the debts incurred by the municipalities themselves, religious holidays, etc.. As in the 
                                                                                                                                                               
universal and without exemptions. The idea of  taxing a single product, in particular flour, was not 
new, and had been re-proposed during the same period by Theodoro Ventura Argumosa y Gándara, 
one of  Vauban’s many Spanish admirers and the skilful plagiarist of  Melon’s Essai, in contrast to the 
hypothesis which suggested extending the Catalan cadastral experience to Castile. Argumosa had 
argued that it was possible to choose between salt and grains and had advised, as had Loynaz, the 
maintenance of  the tobacco monopoly and customs duties on foreign trade. See T. VENTURA 
ARGUMOSA Y GÁNDARA, Erudición política; despertador sobre el comercio, agricultura y manufacturas, con avisos 
de buena política y aumento del Real Erario, Madrid, n. p., 1743. 
56 According to Ensenada, the Catalan experience had demonstrated that the cadastre-based tax 
respected both distributive fairness and social equity better than the Castilian indirect taxes encabezados, 
because it allowed an attack on the wealth of  the privileged classes, who, even when they did not enjoy 
tax immunity, evaded the payment of  consumption taxes by consuming their own rent. On the 
political meaning of  the cadastral option, see the observations of  A. ALIMENTO, Entre justice distributive 
et développement économique: la lutte pour la création des cadastres généraux au 18e siècle, in Kataster und moderner 
Staat, pp. 1–27. 
57 While the superintendentes de Hacienda created by the Marquis of  Los Vélez in the last years of  the 
seventeenth century had predominantly fiscal functions (apart from carrying out the task of  
supporting productive activities), these new Bourbon intendants also had military prerogatives in that 
they were responsible for supplying their district’s army and navy from 1718: the centralization of  the 
administrative system during the reigns of  Philip V and Ferdinand VI involved a kind of  militarization 
of  the most important offices. On intendants in Bourbon monarchies see F.-X. EMMANUELLI, Un 
mythe de l’absolutisme bourbonien: l’intendance, du milieu du XVIIe siècle à la fin du XVIIIe siècle (France, Espagne, 
Amérique), Aix-en-Provence 1981. 
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Catalan catastro, the estimated wealth was organized into two branches: real 
(properties and «rights») and industrial or mercantile (profits and revenues deriving 
from artisanal, liberal and commercial professional activities). 
Particular attention was dedicated to the Church assets. Ecclesiastical 
properties were surveyed separately from lay ones: beneficed real estates (belonging 
to institutions and therefore subject to the constraint of  mortmain) were 
distinguished from assets (or private properties). Later, an attempt was made to draw 
up a register, the book of  the mayor hacendado, which was a record of  the assets of  the 
household that paid the greatest amount of  tithes in each community (this did not 
coincide ipso facto with the richest household). The aim of  this was to calculate the 
product of  the excusado which was to be abolished with the introduction of  the única, 
and so to find out how much the Church was actually paying to the State in the form 
of  the old direct tax, thus producing evidence that the change in the taxation system 
had been justified. 
However, the greatest difficulty that characterized all the procedures of  the 
única contribución even after the cadastre was completed and that ultimately determined 
its final failure was the active and passive opposition coming not only from the 
oligarchies and privileged classes, but also from the common people who often were 
driven to physically attack and throw stones at the appointees. During the cadastral 
operations, this opposition materialized particularly in the deliberate underestimation 
of  the incomes and in the concealment of  assets: tax evasion or avoidance was 
facilitated by the fact that surveyors were usually recruited locally and that local 
oligarchies controlled town councils through their representatives. Making local 
authorities (mayors, parish priests, local magistrates) partly responsible for the 
estimation procedures was an obvious error, which arose not so much from the 
desire to avoid excessive conflict with individuals considered external to the 
community, but rather from the material impossibility on the part of  the Bourbon 
administration to have at its disposal a qualified staff  sufficient for such an 
undertaking. The intendant and the officials of  the Hacienda, diligent and honest as 
they might be, were not able to control everything and everyone. Therefore, the 
unavoidable involvement of  local authorities proved to be a fatal mistake, because 
landowners, oligarchies and the privileged classes, if  not able to go as far as 
boycotting the estimation procedure, were at least able to falsify appraisals, as had 
happened in the previous Catalan experience. In Madrid, Ensenada and the Junta 
were so aware that this was the critical weak point of  the whole procedure, that they 
acted with extreme determination to punish the most blatant cases of  resistance to 
royal orders, as well as the incidents of  corruption or underground solidarity 
(especially with clerics and titled nobles) that involved the intendentes or their 
delegates.58 
Yet, despite the many inaccuracies and attempts to resist, many successes 
were achieved. One of  them was the concordat with the Holy See in 1753 and the 
brief  Exponi nobis super issued by Benedict XIV on 6 September 1757, that authorized 
the inclusion of  the secular and regular clergy into the Castilian única contribución, 
                                                          
58 Cadastral operations, begun in March 1750, ended in 1757 after five years of  hectic work, both in 
Madrid within the Board and at the provincial intendancies, and involved 1,200 cadastral teams, 3,000 
technicians and 6,000 public administration employees of  various kind. Seven million people then 
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which de facto also ended up including the tenths paid to the state (that, as 
previously stated, were collected essentially through subsidio, excusado and tercias 
reales59). This diplomatic success, reached thanks to the contribution of  the Jesuit 
Francisco Rávago, Ferdinand VI’s confessor, was actually essential to the success of  
the entire project of  reform, because the clergy absorbed almost a quarter of  the 
land rents of  the time and, thanks to the mortmain, benefitted from large tax-exempt 
properties60. However, in subsequent years, this solution proved to be an ineffective 
victory, because the resentment and opposition of  the clergy increased, due to the 
fact that the project of  fiscal reform focusing on the direct taxation of  real estate 
brought ecclesiastical immunity into question. Only the expulsion of  the Jesuits, 
which was decreed by Charles III in 1767 and in actuality became a first partial act of  
ecclesiastical desamortización through the confiscation of  the land assets of  the Society 
of  Jesus in the Spanish Assistancy, allowed the government to discipline the clergy, in 
particular the regulars. At that moment, however, it was clear that the cadastral 
project, which had initially fascinated the reforming party, had stopped arousing the 
interest of  the Bourbon government. 
The passing away of  Ferdinand VI in 1759, along with the political 
misfortune that overwhelmed Ensenada, decisively contributed to the decision to halt 
the implementation of  the Castilian geometric appraisal of  land. In fact, during the 
long reign of  Charles III (1759–1788), the cadastral reform was frozen, although the 
legislative process continued as a result of  administrative inertia until 1776.61 Apart 
from the doubts of  the individual officials and ministers of  Charles III,62 the real 
                                                          
59 In the same brief  it was stated beforehand that the “Three Graces” would become a perpetual right 
of  the crown, no longer subject to periodic renewals by the Holy See. 
60 The same strategy had been followed a decade before by Don Carlos in Naples. Concurrently with 
the launch of  the Neapolitan ounce-based cadastre, Charles III signed a concordat with the Holy See, 
which provided that all assets confiscated by the ecclesiastical authorities after 1741 (with the 
exception of  the assets held by parishes, hospitals and seminaries) would be subject to the “real” tax. 
See R. ZANGHERI, Catasti e storia della proprietà terriera, Torino 1980, p. 102; A. BULGARELLI LUKACS, 
Alla ricerca del contribuente. Fisco, catasto, gruppi di potere, ceti emergenti nel Regno di Napoli del XVIII secolo, 
Napoli 2004. 
61 D. MATEOS DORADO, La Única Contribución y el catastro durante la época carolina, «Hacienda Pública 
Española», 2 (1990), pp. 47–58. On 20 June, 1760, Charles III established a second Junta de única 
contribución, presided over by the new Minister of  Finance, the Marquis of  Squillace. However, among 
the first acts of  the new board, there was the launch of  an overall audit of  the estimates carried out in 
the previous five years: this proposal was tantamount to leading the reform into a blind alley. Later on 
a decree signed on 4 July 1770 by Charles III – which established a sala de única contribución within the 
Consejo de Hacienda in lieu of  the Junta (which was dissolved) – provided for the assignment of  a pre-
established fixed quota to each of  the twenty-two Castilian provinces. The operation of  
apportionment was carried out in 1774, but, despite the presence of  local and provincial personnel, 
the sovereign, frightened by the deluge of  appeals by taxpayers (in particular by landowners), did not 
want to apply the reform. Therefore, on 23 July 1776, the Minister of  Finance Múzquiz decided to 
postpone indefinitely the implementation of  the reform in order to examine the complaints and make 
the appropriate adjustments. After a final discussion in the Consejo de Hacienda, between October 1778 
and March 1779, the project of  única contribución was abandoned. See the summary of  this political and 
administrative process in ARTOLA, La Hacienda, pp. 267–279; C. CAMARERO BULLÓN, Informe del 
Consejo de Hacienda a Carlo III sobre el catastro de Ensenada, «Catastro», 51 (2004), pp. 67–107. 
62 Among the officials opposed to the Castilian cadastre there was Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes. 
Already between 1757 and 1759, when he had not yet taken on governmental responsibilities, he 
proposed to replace the alcabalas with a general encabezamiento based on the model of  the Equivalente; 
that is, based on the apportionment of  an annual fixed quota to each Castilian province. Clearly he did 
not trust the coeval cadastral operations, which he considered to be defective and expensive. 
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reason for the definitive shelving of  the project must be sought in the mobilization 
against it by a broad social bloc, which, as previously indicated, brought together 
local oligarchies, the clergy (in particular the regulars) and the nobility, both hidalga 
and titled; in other words, almost all of  the Spanish ruling classes.  
The very existence of  this opposition, strengthened by the awareness that the 
reorganization of  the economic and fiscal policy required the consent of  at least the 
most “enlightened” sector of  the privileged orders, convinced the majority of  the 
reformers of  the late eighteenth century that the cadastre was not the only means to 
achieve fiscal equity, and that, instead it was necessary to tackle the root of  the 
problem, that is to correct the imbalances and inequities in the primary sector. 
Certainly, the gradual penetration of  the European enlightened and reformist ideas 
into Spain (the foundation of  the Sociedades Económicas was one of  its most obvious 
manifestations) helped to reshape the debate on economic issues and to recalibrate 
the priorities of  reformism. Thus, apart from the circulation of  the theses and texts 
of  the Physiocrats, what developed was an eclectic agrarist and agronomic 
consciousness which was already evident in the generation of  the mantéistas reformers 
led by the Asturian fiscal Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes and which would 
characterize especially the so-called Ilustración tardía.63 One of  the theoretical axes of  
this thinking was certainly regalism, which was now no longer exclusively wielded in 
defense of  the legitimate rights of  the Crown, but used as a means to open the way 
for the twofold reform – fiscal and agricultural – longed for by the heterogeneous 
reforming group gathered by Charles III on his arrival in Madrid from Naples. 
 
4. FISCAL REFORM DURING CHARLES III’S REIGN (1759–1788) 
The third “moment” of  the Spanish fiscal reformism can be dated to the first 
decade of  the new king’s reign, which was characterized by a strikingly regalist 
reforming vitality. Although the new minister of  Finance, Marquis of  Squillace, 
followed the main directives of  Ensenada’s fiscal policy (starting from the will to 
apply the Castilian cadastre), his reforming activism was more radical compared to 
the previous years, as demonstrated by the outbreak of  the political crisis of  1766–
                                                                                                                                                               
According to Campomanes, the approximation of  measurements – clear in the case of  Asturias – 
depended upon the still primitive state of  political arithmetic in the Spanish context, which made it 
necessary to translate the works by Petty, Child and Davenant. See V. LLOMBART, A propósito de los 
intentos de reforma de la Hacienda castellana en el siglo XVIII: Campomanes frente al proyecto de Única 
Contribución, «Hacienda Pública Española», 38 (1976), pp. 123–132; ID., Campomanes, económista y político 
de Carlos III, Madrid 1992, pp. 78–83. It should be noted that some of  the arguments to which 
Campomanes and the opponents of  Ensenada’s cadastre resorted closely followed those developed in 
the Kingdom of  Naples by the critics of  the Neapolitan ounce-based cadastre, in particular by C. A. 
Broggia and A. Genovesi: see ZANGHERI, Catasti, pp. 102–106. 
63 On this point, see the observations of  V. LLOMBART, Jovellanos, economista de la Ilustración tardía, in G. 
M. JOVELLANOS, Escritos económicos, Madrid 2000, pp. 3–177; V. LLOMBART, Jovellanos y el otoño de las luces. 
Educación, economía, política y felicidad, Gijón 2012. On the limited penetration of  the Physiocratic 
literature into Spain, see E. LLUCH E., L. ARGEMÍ, Physiocracy in Spain, in «History of  Political 
Economy», 26, 4 (1994), pp. 613–627; E. LLUCH, L. ARGEMÍ, La physiocratie en Espagne: une synthèse 
provisoire, in La diffusion internationale de la physiocratie (XVIIIe–XIXe), edited by B. DELMAS, T. DEMALS, P. 
STEINER, Grenoble 1995, pp. 251–266; E. LLUCH, L. ARGEMÍ, La fisiocracia en España, in Economía y 
economistas españoles, 3, pp. 709–719; J. ASTIGARRAGA, J. USOZ, Algunas puntualizaciones sobre la fisiocracia en 
la Ilustración “tardía” española, in «Revista de Historia Económica. Journal of  Iberian and Latin 
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1767, which was mainly due to the reforms implemented in the fiscal sector.64 The 
foregoing debts contracted during Philip V’s reign, the expenses of  the war against 
England and Portugal in 1762–1763, the cost of  the weddings of  Maria Luisa and 
the Prince of  Asturias (future Charles IV) and the compensation owed for the 
acquisition of  the territory of  Piacenza to the Duchy of  Parma, drove Squillace to 
increase the tax burden (for instance, by asking the three Basque provinces for a 
voluntary donation) in the first place, but, above all, led to a series of  measures that 
overturned centuries-old practices and socio-economic balances: the financial reform 
of  the Castilian municipalities,65 the assumption of  the direct administration of  the 
excusado by the Royal Hacienda66 and the beginning of  the debate on the need to 
reduce the regime of  mortmain (which granted the clergy immunity from real estate 
taxes) were among the most important ones.  
Although this debate, which was born from the need to enforce the 
concordat of  1737, did not culminate in a limitative law (in contrast to what 
happened in the Kingdom of  Naples and in the Duchy of  Parma), it certainly 
influenced the subsequent decision to confiscate the Jesuits temporalidades after their 
expulsion in 1767, for at least three good reasons.67 Firstly, because the political 
protagonist of  all these events is the same, namely the fiscal of  the Consejo de Castilla, 
Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, author of  the famous regalist text Tratado de la 
regalía de amortización, published in 1765 with the explicit aim of  conditioning the 
governmental debate through a direct appeal to the Spanish «civil society». Secondly, 
because in both cases regalism, properly revitalized through the Febronianist and 
Pombaline theses68, represented the essential core of  the reforming action and of  the 
ideology of  the manteístas (i.e. anti-Jesuit) officials who maintained the need to tax (or, 
in extreme cases, expropriate) the clergy. Finally, because among the hidden causes of  
the exile of  the Ignatian order, there is the successful attempt on the part of  the 
Jesuits most influential at court (and, at the same time, in Rome) to boycott the law 
                                                          
64 On this point, see the exhaustive analysis by J. ANDRÉS-GALLEGO, El motín de Esquilache, América y 
Europa, Madrid 2005, pp. 91–197. 
65 On 30 July 1760, Charles III issued a decree providing for the creation of  a specific contaduría general 
de Proprios y Arbitrios dependent on the Council of  Castile and the Department of  Finance, which was 
intended to exercise control over the budgets of  each municipality. Ibid., pp. 163–166 and 329–331. 
66 This last measure, which interrupted the practice of  the quinquennial concordias or agreements that 
had lasted for two hundred years, determined that public officials were to calculate the productivity of  
tithes in each diocese and, subsequently, to carry out the collection. Despite the episcopate’s angry 
reaction, the new king did not back out of  his decision, although the difficulty of  establishing an ad 
hoc administration for tax collection (as had happened in 1571) persuaded Squillace to opt for farming: 
during the sixties, the right of  collection was assigned to a company linked to the Cinco gremios mayores. 
See ARTOLA, La Hacienda, pp. 295–299; ANDRÉS-GALLEGO, El motín de Esquilache pp. 119–126. 
67 N. GUASTI, Lotta politica e riforme all’inizio del regno di Carlo III. Campomanes e l’espulsione dei gesuiti dalla 
monarchia spagnola (1759–1768), Firenze 2006, pp. 91–127 and the bibliography hereafter. 
68 J. KÜZTINGER, Fébronius et le fébronianisme, «Mémoire de l’Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et 
des beaux arts de Belgique», 44 (1889) pp. 1–88; V. PITZER, Justinus Febronius. Das Ringen eines 
katholischen Irenikers um die Einheit der Kirche im Zeitalter des Aufklärung, Göttingen 1976; P. FROWEIN, E. 
JANSON, Johannes Nikolaus von Hontheim - Justinus Febronius. Zum Werk und seinen Gegnern, «AmrhKg», 28 
(1976) pp. 129–153. On the dissemination of  Hontheim’s texts and theses in Spain, see OLAECHEA, 
Las relaciones, pp. 402–404. On Pereira and Portuguese regalism see Z. M. OSÓRIO DE CASTRO, O 
Regalismo em Portugal: António Pereira de Figueiredo, Lisboa 1987; F. C. DOMINGUES, Ilustração e Catolicismo: 
Teodoro de Almeida, Lisboa 1994; J. SEABRA, A teologia ao serviço da política de Pombal: episcopalismo e concepção 
do primado romano na Tentativa Teológica do Padre António Pereira de Figueiredo, in «Lusitania Sacra», 7 (1995) 
pp. 359–402. 
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limiting the mortmain demanded by Campomanes. Therefore, despite the defeat 
represented by the interruption of  this law’s legislative process due to the revolt that 
led to Squillace’s fall (for which Campomanes blamed the Jesuits), the confiscation of  
the assets of  the Spanish branch of  the Society of  Jesus into a specific fund of  the 
Hacienda was a far-reaching political result.69 Ultimately, the non-publication in 1770 
of  the bull In Coena Domini by Clement XIV70 (since the seventeenth century, the 
most important juridical document produced by the papacy in order to justify the 
defense of  the inalienability of  the ecclesiastical properties) must also be ascribed to 
the actions of  Charles III’s government. In fact, after the crisis of  1768 caused by the 
so-called Monitorio of  Parma and in the middle of  the negotiations for the canonical 
suppression of  the Society of  Jesus started as a result of  Spanish diplomacy, the 
pontiff  nourished the hope (which later faded) to barter his measure for the survival 
of  the Order. When it was suppressed in 1773 thanks to the diplomatic intervention 
of  José Moñino (former fiscal de lo criminal of  the Council of  Castile, Campomanes’ 
colleague and future Count of  Floridablanca), Spanish regalism seemed to have 
achieved its most significant victory.71  
It is therefore necessary to stress the political importance of  the expulsion of  
the Jesuits from the kingdom of  Charles III, since it represented not only a measure 
of  partial desamortización, but also a stimulus for the subsequent reform policy. At the 
basis of  the regalism of  Campomanes and the manteístas officials of  Charles III’s 
government, there was the Muratorian idea that the clergy had to contribute to 
public happiness. By emphasizing the utilitarianist outlook already shared by the early 
                                                          
69 F. TOMÁS Y VALIENTE, El marco político de la desamortización en España, Barcelona 1977; B. YUN 
CASALILLA, La venta de los bienes de las temporalidades de la Compañía de Jesús. Una visión general y el caso de 
Valladolid (1767–1808), in M. P. ALONSO ROMERO ET AL., Desamortización y hacienda pública, vol. 1, 
Madrid 1986, pp. 293–316; P. GARCÍA TROBAT, El patrimonio de los jesuitas en Valencia y su desamortización, 
Valencia 1999; A. L. LÓPEZ MARTÍNEZ, El patrimonio rústico de los jesuitas en España. Una aproximación, 
«Hispania», 203 (1999), pp. 925–954; ID., Mecanismos de adquisicio ́n de los elementos que integran la empresa 
agraria de los Jesuitas en Espan ̃a (siglos XVI–XVIII), in Accumulation and Dissolution of  Large Estates of  the 
Regular Clergy in Early Modern Europe, 12th International Economic History Congress, Madrid, 24–28 August 
1998, Session C.8, edited by F. LANDI, Rimini 1999, pp. 27–43; A. L. LÓPEZ MARTÍNEZ, La disoluciόn del 
patrimonio rústico de los Jesuitas en Espan ̃a a partir de su expulsiόn en 1767, in Confische e sviluppo capitalistico. I 
grandi patrimoni del clero regolare in eta ̀ moderna in Europa e nel Continente Americano, edited by F. LANDI, 
Milano 2004, pp. 41–53; F. LANDI, Storia economica del clero in Europa. Secoli XV–XIX, Roma 2005, pp. 
85–86; C. A. MARTÍNEZ TORNERO, Carlos III y los bienes de los jesuitas. La gestión de las temporalidades por la 
monarquía borbónica (1767–1815), Alicante 2010. Sales by auction reached a peak between 1770 and 
1774 (with about 64% of  the total alienated real estate): the good agricultural trend and the increase in 
revenue also due to the effects of  the liberalization of  grain trade made the former Ignatians’ assets 
attractive. 
70 It is known that on 30 January 1768, Clement XIII condemned the jurisdictionalist policy followed 
by the Prime Minister of  the Duchy of  Parma, Du Tillot, because it infringed the provisions of  the 
bull In Coena: see C. Maddalena, Le regole del Principe. Fisco, clero, riforme a Parma e Piacenza (1756–1771), 
Milan 2008. All Bourbon governments, along with the Portuguese, Austrian and Venetian ones, had 
immediately re-established the exequatur and promoted restrictive laws on mortmain. This crisis 
prompted the fiscal Campomanes to write and publish in the same year the Juicio Imparcial […], 
probably the most radical regalist text of  the Spanish eighteenth century.  
71 T. EGIDO - I. PINEDO, Las causas “gravísimas” y secretas de la espulsión de los jesuitas por Carlos III, Madrid 
1994; E. GIMÉNEZ LÓPEZ, Misión en Roma. Floridablanca y la extinción de los jesuitas, Murcia 2008; Conde de 
Floridablanca. Cartas desde Roma para la extinción de los jesuitas. Correspondencia, julio 1772 – septiembre 1774, 
edited by E. Giménez López, Alicante 2009; N. GUASTI, Clemente XIV e la diplomazia spagnola: la genesi del 
breve di soppressione della Compagnia di Gesù, in L’età di Papa Clemente XIV: religione, politica, cultura, edited by 
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eighteenth century proyectistas and regalist officials, the fiscal argued the need to bring 
the ecclesiastical lands onto the market (as had happened in the case of  those taken 
away from the Ignatians, whose 70% was put up for auction by 1784) and, at the 
same time, to reduce the number of  monasteries and convents. The ideal society 
envisaged by Campomanes and his colleagues was that of  the ancient Roman 
Republic based on small property and tenant farming, where the figure of  the 
virtuous and frugal pater familias was harmoniously welded to that of  the patriotic 
citizen.72 The main way to achieve this social project (which was still organicist) was 
by reducing the privileges and immunities of  the clergy and, to a lesser extent, of  the 
nobles, as well as by ensuring a higher economic freedom: thus, the liberalization of  
the wheat trade decreed in July 1765 and the confiscation of  the Jesuit assets were 
regarded as the starting point of  a complex reform of  the Iberian rank-based society, 
aimed at making it more dynamic and fair.73 
Consequently, in the years immediately following 1767, Campomanes 
promoted a series of  debates and reforms which became indelibly associated with 
the years of  Charles III’s reign: the restoration of  the royal exequatur for pontifical 
documents, the repopulation of  the Sierra Morena carried out by the intendant Pablo 
de Olavide (when former Jesuit assets were used to repopulate some Andalusian 
villages), the discussion on the agrarian law based on the Roman model (which ended 
in 1795 with the famous Informe by Jovellanos), the progressive reduction in the 
number of  the monasteries of  the religious orders (achieved through a series of  
complicated negotiations with the various local ecclesiastical authorities). All the 
discussions in government circles – some of  which resulted in precise legislative 
measures – were accompanied by continuous appeals to the Iberian (and Creole) 
ruling classes to redefine their role in accordance with a patriotic perspective. In 
addition, there was a desire to elevate the study of  civil and political economy to the 
status of  a science and to rank it as an academic subject. Campomanes and the 
reformers of  his generation identified the Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País as the 
place where these ambitions merged.74  
                                                          
72 On this point, see the observations of  R. HERR, Rural change and royal finances in Spain at the end of  the 
old regime, Berkeley 1989, spanish transl. La Hacienda Real y los cambios rurales en la España de finales del 
Antiguo Regimen, Madrid 1991, pp. 79–91. 
73 G. ANES, La Ley Agraria, Madrid 1995; C. de Castro, Campomanes. Estado y reformismo ilustrado, Madrid, 
1996; HERR, La Hacienda Real, pp. 91–110; LLOMBART, Campomanes, economista, pp. 191–233. At that 
time, the ilustrado who developed the most radical criticism of  the society of  the Old Regime (starting 
from an analysis of  the Iberian economic and fiscal situation, as well as from the usual condemnation 
of  the Rentas provinciales) was certainly León Arroyal. See his Cartas económico-políticas, Oviedo 1971. Not 
surprisingly, his work remained unpublished until 1841, although it was written between 1786 and 
1790. 
74 LLOMBART, Campomanes, economista, pp. 277–291, 343–367; V. LLOMBART, J. ASTIGARRAGA, Las 
primeras “antorchas de la economía”: las sociedades económicas de amigos del país en el siglo XVIII, in Economía y 
economistas, 3, pp. 677–707; J. ASTIGARRAGA, Campomanes y la Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País. 
Estructura política, descentralización económica y reformismo ilustrado, in Campomanes doscientos años después, 
edited by D. MATEOS DORADO, Oviedo 2003, pp. 617–667; J. ASTIGARRAGA, Los ilustrados vascos. Ideas, 
instituciones y reformas económicas en España, Barcelona 2003; ID., Esfera pública e instituciones ilustradas: el 
debate sobre las sociedades económicas en el último tercio del siglo XVIII en España, in Más Estado y más mercado. 
Absolutismo y economía en la España del siglo XVIII, edited by G. PÉREZ SARRIÓN, Madrid 2011, pp. 235–
260. On the creation of  the first chair of  political economy (24 October 1784), held by Lorenzo 
Normante, member of  the Sociedad económica aragonesa of  Zaragoza, see J. USOZ, El pensamiento económico 
de la Ilustración aragonesa, in Economía y economistas, 3, pp. 583–606; J. ASTIGARRAGA, J. USOZ, El 
pensamiento político y económico ilustrado y las cátedras de la sociedad económica aragonesa, in «Anuario de Historia 
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In conclusion, during the middle of  Charles III’s reign – from 1766-67 until 
the mid-eighties – there was a reversal of  the reform policy, which was unlike what 
had happened during Ensenada’s long administration. The issue of  the re-launch of  
agriculture (and trade with the American colonies) overshadowed that of  the tax 
reform, although the debate on reform continued along the guidelines set forth in 
the first decades of  the eighteenth century.75  
The fourth phase of  the Spanish fiscal reformism, which can be dated to the 
end of  Charles III’s reign, had as its protagonist the Secretary of  Stare Floridablanca, 
who was the real promoter of  the reform of  the frutos civiles implemented between 
June 1785 and July 178776. In these years, under the pressure of  the increase in deficit 
caused by the Spanish intervention in the American War of  Independence and by the 
reorganization of  the public debt,77 the urgent need for a general tax reform – in 
particular of  the Castilian taxation system – arose again. The tax on «frutos naturales 
e industriales» – which, not by chance, sprang from an idea of  the French-born 
officer Francisco Cabarrús, founder of  the Banco de San Carlos in 1780 and inventor 
of  the vales reales78 – was imposed mainly on land incomes and rents and should have 
replaced the Castilian Rentas Provinciales and the ecclesiastical subsidio. To prevent 
owners from shifting the tax onto their tenants by raising the rent, Floridablanca 
initially proposed corrective measures, before imposing a ceiling on the practice by 
law. The collection would be entrusted to the administrators of  the ecclesiastical 
tithes. The final version, summarized in an istrucción reservada attached to the decree of  
8 July 1787, provided for the division of  taxpayers into six classes. The first was 
composed of  the owners of  real estates and public debt bonds, who had to pay the 
5% on revenues. The second was formed from the tenants. Given the impossibility 
to use the by-then discredited cadastral tool to calculate the settlers’ income, the most 
reliable measure was the rental itself, because, according to Floridablanca, it 
represented a part of  the land product. In this case, the quota to be collected had to 
be between 2 and 3% of  the rental value. The other categories of  taxpayers – 
merchants, artisans, wage-earners, civil servants – would pay to the State only indirect 
taxes, while the clergy were exempt from the direct tax. In conclusion, 
Floridablanca’s reform, which was accompanied by the creation of  provincial 
councils on Necker’s model, certainly was the most significant and pragmatic of  
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Charles III’s reign.79 For the first time in the history of  the Castilian taxation system, 
it tried to bring together and integrate a direct tax on incomes from land (rather than 
on land property, as originally suggested by Cabarrús) with indirect taxes. The refusal 
to employ any cadastral tool was the axiom and premise from which Charles III’s 
minister had started.80 
However, the absence of  a cadastre did not facilitate the imposition of  the 
reform. Also, the tax reliefs provided for on the direct taxes paid by the artisans were 
not enough to erase the uneven approach to the taxation. Therefore, the opposition 
to the contribución de frutos civiles was immediately very strong, especially on the part of  
the landed nobility. But, in the long run, what decided the fate of  the tax was the 
inflation of  the paper securities issued by the Banco de San Carlos and the increase in 
the budget deficit due to the war against republican France. Thus, in September 
1794, the tax on frutos civiles was replaced by a 6% tax on all the agricultural rentals 
and a 4% tax on house rentals, with the exception of  the great majority of  the 
ecclesiastical properties.81 Before being fired in 1792, Floridablanca tried at least to 
impose the principle already established by Uztáriz at the beginning of  the century 
according to which at the base of  any fiscal reform there was the need for a prior 
survey of  the taxpayers’ means. This was the reason for the population census of  
1787 (which was then followed by the censo de frutos y manufacturas de España e islas 
adyacentes published in 180382) and the review of  the Castilian encabezamientos started in 
June 1785.  
 
5. TOWARDS THE CÁDIZ CORTES 
The fifth and final season of  the Spanish fiscal policy can be seen to range 
from the mid-nineties to the development of  a fiscal reform (which was never 
implemented) by the Cádiz constituents in 1813. It is a convulsive phase in which, as 
part of  the attempt to re-establish the Spanish monarchy on constitutional grounds, 
the projects and attempts of  the previous decades were re-elaborated in order to 
reorganize taxation (in particular the Castilian system) on the grounds of  fairness. 
Undoubtedly, before the tax debate that took place within the Cádiz Cortes, the most 
relevant fiscal measure was the so-called desamortización of  1798, which had been 
proposed since 1794 by one of  the senior officials of  the Ministry of  Finance, 
Cayetano Soler.83 As Richard Herr has rightly argued, the origin of  this measure – 
which was revolutionary to a certain extent – must be found in the sudden growth of  
                                                          
79 J. ASTIGARRAGA, La obra de Jacques Necker: una influencia fundamental en la Ilustración económica española, in 
Economía y economistas españoles, 3, pp. 729–753. 
80 Between the eighties and the nineties the rich debate on spanish treasury was leaded by some of  the 
major ilustrados as Cabarrús, Alcalá, Jovellanos, Foronda and Arroyal: see J. ASTIGARRAGA, N. GUASTI 
AND J. ZABALZA, The Spanish debate on public finance: a privileged laboratory for enlightened reforms, in The 
Spanish Enlightenment revisited, edited by J. Astigarraga, Oxford, 2015, pp. 169–191. 
81 By means of  the Real cédula of  8 September 1794, it was replaced with an extraordinary tax of  6% 
on all land rentals aimed at amortizing the vales reales, which remained in force until 1817. 
82 J. FONTANA, El “Censo de frutos y manufacturas de 1799”: un análisis crítico, «Moneda y Crédito», 101 
(1967), pp. 54–68. 
83 HERR, La Hacienda Real, pp. 111–157. It needs to be remembered that between the second half  of  
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reales), used among other things to finance the “crusade” against the French Republic and the war 
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the deficit and in the inflation suffered by the vales reales, the new titles of  public debt 
(usable as paper money) issued since 1780. However, the reforming ideology at its 
base dated back to the reform projects (especially in the field of  agriculture) shared 
by the group of  officials led by Campomanes. It was not by chance that, while the 
arguments put forward by Charles IV in his decrees of  1798 echoed the theses of  the 
Tratado de la regalía and of  Jovellanos’ informe on the agrarian law, the 
practical mechanism chosen to expropriate and sell ecclesiastical lands 
closely conformed with the previous plan of  1767 – ideated by 
Campomanes – to confiscate the properties of  the Jesuits (and of  the 
Colegios mayores). Thus, although the measure of  1798 was applied during 
Charles IV’s reign, it can be regarded as a  late outcome of  the reforming 
culture of  Charles III’s time .84 
In his decrees, the king distinguished two types of  ecclesiastical 
assets: those fully owned by parishes, chapters and regular orders; and those 
which had been originally donated by public authorities and private citizens 
in order to allow the clergy to carry out their spiritual and charitable 
service. The sovereign, following Campomanes’ jurisdictionalist theses, 
considered the latter ones as public assets – they included the lands of  
charitable institutions, chaplaincies and the so-called obras pías managed by 
confraternities, hospitals and hospices85 – and therefore under the Crown’s 
jurisdiction. In a time of  trouble, the monarchy, committed to defend the 
Church against the danger of  the Revolution, recovered the full possession 
of  these assets, which were later sold at auction. Sales proceeds were 
intended for a special Sinking Fund with a threefold task: to ensure an 
interest rate of  3% to public debt securities (since real estate held in 
mortmain had been formally associated with securities intended to 
guarantee an income to their former owners), to finish paying the debts 
incurred during the previous years with certain Dutch bankers and 
progressively redeem the vales reales issued in excessive amounts in the 
nineties.86 Apart from the financial urgency of  the moment, the 
desamortización was part of  a precise logic of  reform. On the one hand, the 
jurisdictionalist frame, which, by forcing a solution to the age -old problem 
of  the taxability of  mortmain tenures which had arisen with Article 8 of  the 
concordat of  1737, associated immovable property with  the “public” 
services (essentially charitable assistance) offered by the secular and regular 
clergy. On the other hand, the hope was revived that this measure might 
stimulate the take-off  of  agriculture thanks to the placing on the market of  
large amounts of  land. Furthermore, the king explicitly reiterated the so cial 
fairness of  the measure, since it excluded productive classes from the levy 
and hit only the privileged classes. It was not by chance that his fourth and 
final decree provided for an initial measure of  alienation (always by public 
auction) of  the mayorazgos properties. Therefore, apart from presenting 
itself  as a fiscal reform focused on the alienation of  part of  the 
ecclesiastical properties, the desamortización of  1798 was the first step toward 
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overcoming the Old Regime in Spain, a process that ended on 1 May 1855 
with the law signed by Pascual Madoz87.  
Not surprisingly, the clergy tried to fight the expropriation of  their 
properties in various ways, usually by registering them in the name of  
private citizens or mortgaging them before the implementation of  the 
decrees. There was also a libelous invective, not only because the  
desamortización seemed to be reminiscent of  the alienation of  the French 
national assets related to the issue of  the assignats and the Civil Constitution 
of  the Clergy, but also because it was followed by the so-called “Urquijo’s 
schism”.  88 Ironically, this press campaign superimposed itself  on the other 
anti-revolutionary and anti-Napoleonic one.89 However, on the whole, the 
operation of  alienation proceeded without too many hitches mainly because 
the government had made provision for some cash incentives in favour of  
the judges supervising public auctions. In addition, between 1805 and 1807, 
Pope Pius VII pandered to the Spanish government by endorsing the 
decrees of  1798 with a series of  briefs. 90 As a consequence, in 1808 at the 
beginning of  the reign of  Joseph Bonaparte, the Sinking Fund had managed 
to redeem 14% of  the circulating vales reales thanks to the sales made until 
then. So in these years the foundations for a radical change of  the taxation 
system were laid. In fact, while the Napoleonic government continued the 
activity of  desamortización to attack its political opponents, on 7 August 1809 
the Junta central decreed the abolition of  the Castilian Rentas Provinciales by 
resurrecting the project of  the única contribución. 
For this reason, practically everyone who engaged in the economic 
and fiscal debates during the Cádiz Cortes continued to slavishly criticize the 
Rentas Provinciales. Indeed, José Canga Argüelles and the members of  the 
commission in charge of  discussing the fiscal reform of  1810 continued to debate 
themes and reform projects put forward in the eighteenth century. 91 It is not 
surprising that the vast majority of  the constituents – even among those proposing a 
                                                          
87 For a summary of  the legislative measures that characterized the three main elements which would 
support the creation of  a free land market (namely, the complete alienation of  ecclesiastical property, 
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of  1814 until 1855, ibid. pp. 830–833. 
88 The proclamation of  the Roman Republic, the collapse of  the Curia and the death of  Pius VI (20 
August 1799) led the Minister of  Justice, Mariano Luis de Urquijo, to decree the administrative 
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fatal Reinado de Carlo IV. Dirigidas a la Nación española en Cortes Generales, Madrid, Oficina de Collado, 
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90 On 15 April 1817 the Pope confirmed the taxability of  ecclesiastical real estate properties with a 
brief, in view of  a contribución general decreed by Ferdinand VII. On the attempts of  a tax reform during 
the first phase of  the restoration of  the Bourbon regime, see FONTANA, La quiebra de la Monarquía 
absoluta, pp. 136–171. 
91 F. LÓPEZ CASTELLANO, Estudio preliminar, in MARTÍNEZ DE MONTAOS ET AL., El pensamiento 
hacendístico liberal, Madrid 1999, pp. xiii–cciv. 
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single tax – disapproved the idea of  a new cadastre: suffice to mention the case of  
the Memoria of  9 September 1811 written by Canga Argüelles himself.92 Even though 
the important tax reform of  13 September 1813 (never implemented, due to the 
restoration of  Ferdinand VII) provided for the creation of  a universal direct tax on 
real estate, it resorted to the system of  the provincial apportioned quota managed by 
the single municipalities and was not subject to general survey audits promoted by 
the central government. Although it had been renewed, this was still effectively the 
old system, because calculations were based on the data collected through the censo of  
1799.93 Thus, after a century, the debate had returned to the starting point, that is, to 
the same principles that – following the example of  Vauban’s Dîme Royale – Patiño 
had initially tried to apply through the Catalan catastro, and that Zavala had defended 
in his Representación of  1732. Clearly, Ensenada’s cadastral experience continued to be 
a cumbersome obstacle for everyone who wanted to introduce the direct taxation of  
real estate. In addition to the accusations that the operation was slow and expensive, 
two arguments that had been already put forward by the council in charge of  
overseeing the cadastral procedure in 1749 ended up taking root. The first one 
concerned the inaccuracy of  the survey, which should have been periodically 
corrected or adjusted; the second concerned the disparity in determining the tax base 
between agricultural products and movable wealth: on the one hand, the real tax 
weighing on land was calculated according to the gross product without diverting the 
costs of  production; on the other, incomes from rents, mortgage loans, commercial 
profits, wages etc. were calculated on the basis of  their net yield. The attempt to 
revise this specific aspect of  the reform – made without much conviction in the early 
seventies of  the eighteenth century – was in fact nullified by the decision to calculate 
tax discounts in an intuitive manner, without any impartial back-up provided by 
surveyors. 
Yet the negative myth that caused the rejection of  the hypothesis in favour of  
a general geometric parcel-based cadastre did not affect the myth of  a single tax as 
the supreme panacea for the ills of  Spanish taxation;94 nor, oddly enough, did it 
prevent the use of  the cadastral procedures promoted by Ensenada for statistical 
purposes. Not only the very opponents of  the Castilian cadastre (such as 
Campomanes) several times used the quantitative figures and estimates collected 
between 1750 and 1757 for the daily practice of  government, but from a doctrinal 
point of  view the catastro gained unexpected posthumous fame. Once again, we are 
faced with a paradox (one the many featuring the fascinating history of  eighteenth 
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century Spain), because although the first general geometric and parcel-based 
cadastre of  the Spanish territory was carried out only in 1909, Ensenada’s única 
contribución represented, for more than a century and a half, the banner of  the 
supporters of  the modern cadastre seen as a means of  tax fairness (although, in 
truth, their number was limited).  
In conclusion, it is worth underlining that the red thread connecting the 
different moments of  Spanish fiscal reformism was the will to make the tax system 
fairer and more equal by shifting the levy from the consumption of  subsistence 
goods to the taxpayers’ real income. The measures taken by various governments and 
ministers during the eighteenth century were often inconsistent and were faced with 
the successful resistance of  the privileged classes, as in the case of  the ambitious 
única contribución. Anyway, the vitality of  the debates on the fiscal reform shows that a 
sector of  the Spanish ruling classes tried to change the Old Regime society from the 
top, keenly aware of  the link between the reform of  the agrarian world and the shift 
of  the levy from indirect taxes (excise taxes and customs duties) to direct ones 
weighing on real estate and incomes in general. If  eventually the last generation of  
ilustrados (including the pro-Bonapartist afrancesados) and the first generation 
of  Spanish liberals failed in the objective of  strengthening the class of  small 
landowners and tenants to whom they wanted to entrust the re-launch of  
the Iberian economy,95 this was the result not of  supposed and unproven 
theoretical aporias (symbolized by the poor fortune of  the physiocratic 
economic doctrine), but rather of  the capacity for resistance of  the 
privileged classes, who proved to be refractory to change. Therefore, it was 
up to the later Iberian politicians to try to untangle the knotty issue that the 
eighteenth century proyectistas, reformers and ilustrados had so sharply 
identified. 
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